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Striking an Unequal Balance: The Fourth Circuit Holds that
Public School Teachers Do Not Have First Amendment Rights
to Set Curricula in Boring v. Buncombe County Board of
Education
The United States Supreme Court first affirmed the existence of
teachers' First Amendment rights in 1923,1 but it has never spoken
directly to the degree of protection that the First Amendment
provides teachers for in-class speech The protection of in-class,
curricular speech implicates at least two competing interests: a
teacher's right to expression under the First Amendment, and a
school system's right to set the curriculum.3 The lower courts have
struggled with the difficulty of balancing these interests for two
reasons. First, the Supreme Court has created two standards under
1. See Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 411 (1923) (holding that state statutes that
prevent the teaching of a foreign language in the public schools violate the liberty of
parents, teachers, and students under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (same); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be argued that either
students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate. This has been the unmistakable holding of this Court for almost 50
years.").
2. See Gregory A. Clarick, Note, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment:
Protecting the Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693, 696 (1990); see also Scallet v.
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1009 (W.D. Va. 1996) ("It is axiomatic that '[a] state may
not dismiss a public school teacher because of the teacher's exercise of speech protected
by the First Amendment.' Determining, however, the exact scope of a teacher's first
amendment protections is an intricate endeavor." (quoting Stroman v. Colleton County
Sch. Dist., 981 F.2d 152, 155-56 (4th Cir. 1992))). For purposes of this Note, in-class
speech encompasses curricular decisions concerning both instructional methods and
instructional materials and may also include non-curricular speech.
3. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion)
("[T]he discretion of... local school boards in matters of education must be exercised in a
manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment.");
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 1972) (weighing a school board's
discretion over curriculum against First Amendment rights of teachers within the
classroom); Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (explaining
that schools function to "develop inquisitive minds and independent thought" and to
"provide intellectual and moral guidance" to students based on community values);
Clarick, supra note 2, at 697-98 (explaining the conflict between the interest of a school
over "the content and procedures of public education" and a teacher's right to free speech
and expression). Some courts have also suggested that First Amendment protection of
teacher classroom speech is for the benefit of students and society rather than the teacher.
See, e.g., Krizek, 713 F. Supp. at 1137 ("[T]he protection is primarily for the benefit of the
student, and as a result, society in general.").
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which a teacher's First Amendment rights may be analyzed, yet
neither seems completely appropriate to evaluate the in-class rights of
teachers. One line of cases provides standards to clarify the
permissible scope of public speech by all government employees,
including out-of-class speech by public school teachers.4 Other cases
have looked to standards promulgated by the Court to assess the
extent of students' First Amendment rights within the classroom.,
Neither analysis has proven entirely satisfactory in evaluating a
teacher's right to speak in the classroom, however, because a public
school teacher's in-class speech is different from both the at-work
speech of a typical government employee and from student speech.6
The goal of a teacher's classroom speech is to educate students
by exposing them to ideas that are part of the public discourse and to
teach students skills necessary to allow them to participate
meaningfully as members of society.7 The cases dealing with the
4. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (determining that public
employee speech on "matters of public concern" is protected under the First Amendment
and must be balanced against the State's interest as an employer in providing effective
services); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983) (establishing a public
concern test as the threshold inquiry to be followed by the Pickering balancing test);
Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,287 (1977) (stating that
a public employee has established a prima facie case if he can show his expression was
protected and that such expression was a substantial or motivating factor in the decision to
discipline him). For further discussion of the Pickering-Connick-Mount Healthy line of
cases, see infra notes 105-39 and accompanying text.
5. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,266, 273 (1988); Tinker, 393
U.S. at 511-12; see also infra notes 140-52 (discussing Hazelwood); infra notes 169-99 and
accompanying text (discussing the application of the Hazelwood test in the lower courts);
infra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the test applied in Tinker); infra notes 155-
58 (same).
6. See Clarick, supra note 2, at 702 ("Teachers' in-class speech addressed to students
is neither 'internal workplace speech,'... nor explicitly a part of public debate .... [A]
teacher's in-class expression has dramatic public repercussions because of its role in
educating students.").
7. See id.; see also Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("The
classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon
leaders trained through wide exposure to [the] robust exchange of ideas .... "); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion) ("Teachers and students
must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and
understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die."). Both Keyishian and
Sweezy, however, concerned the First Amendment rights of university professors and
instructors. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 591; Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 243 (plurality opinion).
The Supreme Court has not extended the academic freedom of university professors to
secondary and elementary teachers because of the countervailing weight of the school
board's control of curriculum. See Howard 0. Hunter, Curriculum, Pedagogy, and the
Constitutional Rights of Teachers in Secondary Schools, 25 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 1, 4-5
(1983); see also Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 539-40 (10th Cir. 1979) ("Most of the
[academic freedom] cases ... have arisen at the university level ... ."). Despite this fact,
courts often cite cases concerning the free expression rights of college and university
1961
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internal workplace speech of other government employees, however,
stress the informative nature of the protected speech to the public at
large.' Student speech within the classroom is protected to the extent
that it does not "materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school" or intrude on the rights of others;9 neither
would appear to be relevant to the purposes of teacher speech.
Furthermore, to the extent that student speech might be considered
to be sponsored by the school, school administrators may regulate the
speech as long as such regulations are based on "legitimate
pedagogical concerns."'10
The second difficulty in determining the proper protection of
curricular speech arises because most lower courts have recognized
some First Amendment protection for "academic freedom" among
secondary public school teachers, but they have not agreed how far
this right extends when balanced against the weight of the school
system's interest in establishing the curriculum." The balance
appears to have shifted in favor of school districts since 1988, when
the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier2 clearly established school administration control over
school-sponsored student expression. 3  This result is not
professors and instructors as precedent when determining the free speech rights of
secondary school teachers, and vice versa. See, e.g., Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d
773, 336 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), a case
that determined "the extent to which a university may restrict a professor's classroom
expression"); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1009-12 (discussing secondary school cases to
determine which standard to apply in evaluating the limits of a university professor's
classroom speech). Courts often take the age of the students into account, however. See,
e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271 ("[A] school must be able to take into account the
emotional maturity of the intended audience....").
8. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (stating that internal employee speech must relate to
a matter of "political, social, or other concern to the community" in order to be protected
under the First Amendment).
9. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (holding that students wearing black armbands at school to
protest the Vietnam War did not substantially disrupt or materially interfere with school
activities).
10. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
11. See Hunter, supra note 7, at 4-5, 14-15; see also infra notes 224-35 and
accompanying text (discussing the concept of academic freedom).
12. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
13. See id. at 273 (holding that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns"); see also Clarick, supra note 2, at 708-09 ("In Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhimeier, the Supreme Court... dramatically expanded school boards' powers
to regulate student speech.... [and] teachers' free speech rights are called into doubt by
the Hazelwood opinion."). Several commentators have indicated that Hazelwood
narrowed teachers' free speech rights in the classroom when balanced against the power of
1962 [Vol. 77
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determinative, however, since Hazelwood only addressed student
speech. 4 It mentioned teachers' rights only in dicta, and did not
address the issue of "academic freedom" at all.'5
In Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education,6 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt directly with the
issue of how a teacher's in-class, curricular expression should be
analyzed. A closely-divided en banc court held that public school
teachers have no First Amendment rights to control curricular
decisions.'7 The court based its holding on its determination that a
school board had a "legitimate pedagogical interest" in a teacher's
choice and production of a school play that was part of the school's
curriculum. 8
This Note first discusses the facts of Boring, followed by the
Fourth Circuit's resolution of the issues presented by the case. 9 The
Note reviews the background on the free speech rights of teachers
established in decisions by the Supreme Court as well as by state
courts and the lower federal courts2 The Note discusses Boring's
implications for future Fourth Circuit decisions governing teacher in-
class speech and its possible effects on teacher and school board
actions. Finally, the Note suggests a new standard by which the
courts could evaluate a teacher's classroom speech.2'
Margaret Boring, a drama teacher at Charles D. Owen High
School in Black Mountain, North Carolina, had been employed as a
teacher by the Buncombe County, North Carolina school system
since 19792 While at Owen, Boring established herself as an
exceptional drama teacherP3 Many of Boring's students went on to
the school board to establish the curriculum. See Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen,
The Hazelwood Progeny: Autonomy and Student Expression in the 1990's, 69 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 379, 401 (1995); E. Edmund Reutter, Sr., Academic Freedom Advisory: Be Wary
of the Long Arm of Kuhlmeier, 89 EDUc. L. REP. 347, 353 (1994); Lee Gordon, Note,
Achieving a Student-Teacher Dialectic in Public Secondary Schools: State Legislatures
Must Promote Value-Positive Education, 36 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 397,407-08 (1991).
14. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
15. See id. at 267.
16. 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998).
17. See id. at 366.
18. See id. at 369-70.
19. See infra notes 22-97 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 98-245 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 246-89 and accompanying text.
22. See Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 98 F.3d 1474, 1476 (4th Cir. 1996),
vacated en banc, 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir.) (7-6 decision), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 47 (1998).
23. See id. Margaret Boring had "'built a national reputation for excellence in
teaching drama and directing and producing theater.'" Id. (quoting Appellant's
Complaint at 3, Boring (No. 95-2593)).
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study drama in college, often winning scholarships to enable them to
do so. In 1992 alone, her college-bound students received over
$260,000 in scholarships.24 In addition, Boring produced and directed
a number of award-winning plays.25
In the fall of 1991, Boring selected the play Independence for her
advanced acting class to perform in a statewide competition.26 It
depicts the story of a divorced mother and her three daughters, one a
lesbian and another pregnant with an illegitimate child.27 As she did
each year, Boring notified the school principal, Fred Ivey, of the
name of the play for the competition.2 Ivey did not respond to the
selection in any way.29 Boring then sent copies of the script home
with each of the four student actors so that they could discuss the play
with their parents, none of whom complained." At a regional drama
competition, the play won seventeen of twenty-one awards.31 After
the regional competition, but before the state finals, the acting class
performed a scene from the play for an English class at the English
teacher's request.32 Prior to the class performance, Boring told the
teacher that the students should bring in parental permission slips to
see the play due to its subject matter.33 One of the English students,
who had not received parental permission to see the scene, described
its contents to his parents after watching the performance.' One of
his parents later complained to Ivey, who subsequently read the play
and notified Boring that the play could not be performed at the state
finals.35 At the urging of the parents of the actors, however, Ivey
allowed the performance to continue with certain sections deleted.36
The play won second place in the state competition.37
24. See id
25. See id
26. See id.
27. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 366.
28. See id.
29. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1476.
30. See id
31. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 366.
32. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1476.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 366. Boring invited Ivey and the school system
superintendent, Dr. Frank Yeager, to observe the students' performance of the play for
their parents before making a decision as to whether the play could be performed in the
state finals. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1476. Both men declined the invitation and refused to
allow the students to perform at the school. See id. Instead, the students performed the
play for their parents at one of the student's homes. See id.
36. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 366.
37. See id.
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Boring received her performance evaluation for the school year
on June 2, 1992.38 She received "superior" and "well above standard"
evaluations in all areas, including "Interacting in the Educational
Environment" and "Performing Non-Instructional Duties.
39
Nevertheless, ten days later, Ivey requested Boring's transfer from
the high school due to "personal conflicts" ensuing from her actions
during the 1991-92 school year.4' The superintendent of the school
system, Dr. Frank Yeager, granted the request and moved Boring to
an introductory drama position at a middle school.4' Dr. Yeager
justified the transfer on the grounds that Boring, by producing the
play Independence, had failed to comply with the school system's
controversial materials policy 2 Boring appealed her transfer to the
Buncombe County Board of Education ("Board"), which upheld her
transfer after a hearing. 3
Boring then filed suit in state court against the Board members,
Principal Ivey, and Superintendent Yeager,44 alleging that the transfer
violated her free speech rights under the First45 and Fourteenth46
38. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1476.
39. Id.
40. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 366-67. Boring and Ivey had collided over other matters
besides Independence during the school year, including a disagreement over the
construction of sets on a new stage floor in the school auditorium. See id The school had
moved to a new building during the summer of 1991, and at that time, Boring spoke with
Ivey about the difficulty of mounting stage sets on the new floor. See icL Ivey asked
Boring to use plywood as a temporary surface over the stage floor and asked her first to
obtain his approval before doing any construction work in the auditorium. See id. As they
had previously agreed, Boring asked Ivey for his approval to build sets on the new floor,
but was told that she did not need his approval for the construction of sets, only for
fixtures on the floor. See id In order to construct sets required for the production of the
spring musical, Boring covered the stage floor with plywood, which she attached to the
floor with screws. See id After the musical ended, the plywood covering was removed,
leaving holes in the floor. See id. The floor ultimately had to be refinished. See id.
41. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1476.
42. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367. According to Boring's brief, the controversial
materials policy required prior parental consent for student exposure to controversial
materials. See Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Boring v. Buncombe County, 136 F.3d 364
(4th Cir. 1998) (No. 95-2593). At the time the play was performed for the English class,
dramatic presentations were not included in the policy. See id There is no statement as to
what the term "controversial materials" encompassed. Boring did not allege, however,
that the policy was vague or overbroad. See id.
43. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367. The hearing was held in September 1992. See id.
44. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1476.
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .... ).
46. See id amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law ... ."). The Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause applied to the states by incorporation through the
Fourteenth Amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
North Carolina Constitution.4 7 Boring asserted that the transfer was
ordered in retaliation for the unpopular ideas she expressed by
producing the play.' The defendants removed the case to federal
district court and then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.49
The district court upheld the transfer and dismissed the federal and
state law claims.50 It held, first, that Boring's selection and production
of Independence was not protected speech under the First
Amendment.5' Second, the court held that even if Boring's selection
of the play could qualify as protected speech, such speech would not
receive First Amendment protection in this case because the school
system "had a legitimate interest in curbing such speech. 5 2
Boring appealed the dismissal of her First Amendment claims to
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 3 Judge Motz, writing for a
divided Fourth Circuit panel,54 addressed the district court's first
holding-that Boring's actions did not constitute speech-by stating
that plays are expressive by nature and are, therefore, deserving of
First Amendment protection regardless of whether the speaker can
demonstrate an intent to communicate a certain view.5 5 Turning to
the district court's second and alternative holding, the panel noted
47. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367; see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 14 (amended 1970)("Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and
therefore shall never be restrained, but every person shall be held responsible for their
abuse."). In addition, Boring declared that her due process rights and liberty interests
under the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, § 19 of the North Carolina Constitution
were violated on the grounds that the school board, in upholding her transfer, took
information into account that was not provided at the hearing. See Boring, 136 F.3d at
367; see also N.C. CONST. art. I, § 19 (amended 1970) ("No person shall be ... in any
manner deprived of his life, liberty, or property but by the law of the land."). The court
dismissed these claims, however, and they were not pursued on appeal. See Appellant's
Opening Brief at 2 n.2, Boring (No. 95-2593).
48. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
49. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1477.
50. See id.
51. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367. The district court held that the "plaintiff's act of
selecting, producing, and directing a play did not constitute 'speech' within the meaning of
the First Amendment." Id.
52. Boring, 98 F.3d at 1477.
53. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
54. The panel consisted of Judge Motz, Judge Widener, and Judge Murnaghan. See
Boring, 98 F.3d at 1474. Judge Motz wrote the majority opinion, which reversed and
remanded the case to the district court. See id. at 1475. Judge Murnaghan joined the
majority opinion. See id Judge Widener dissented. See id. at 1485 (Widener, J.,
dissenting).
55. See id- at 1477. The panel reasoned that the First Amendment protects speech
even if it is not original expression and that the district court erred by concluding that
Boring's selection of the play was not protectable speech. See id. at 1478.
1966 [Vol. 77
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that the district court had assumed that the Board's "legitimate
pedagogical reasons" for limiting Boring's expression were valid
without requiring the Board to provide any such reasons.56 The panel
stressed that, without exception, courts had required school
administrators to demonstrate these concerns by affidavit or at trial
and that dismissal of Boring's complaint on the pretrial motion was
therefore premature.5 7
The panel concluded that the relevant issue in the case was not
whether teachers have First Amendment protection in the classroom,
but to what extent that protection can be limited by school officials.58
56. See id. at 1479.
57. See id. As the panel emphasized, "a 'motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted.' It is 'only in the unusual case where the
complaint on its face reveals some insuperable bar to relief that dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6) is warranted."' Id (quoting 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1990)).
After rejecting the district court's rationale, the panel turned to alternative arguments
put forth in defendants' briefs in support of the district court's decision to dismiss the
complaint. See iL The defendants argued that before the "legitimate pedagogical
concerns" standard of Hazelwood was applied, a teacher should first demonstrate that her
speech deserved First Amendment protection by meeting the "public concern" test
articulated by the Supreme Court in Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). See id at
1478. A "legitimate pedagogical concern" is one that has a "valid educational purpose."
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); see also Lacks v. Ferguson
Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that a "legitimate
academic interest" of a school board includes "teaching students the boundaries of socially
appropriate behavior" and inculcating community morals).
The panel rejected this use of the Connick line of cases, which have examined the
latitude of a public worker outside of the employment context to speak about
employment-related matters to others or to the public. Connick was inapposite, the panel
concluded, because a teacher's primary role in the classroom is to discuss issues of public
concern with students. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1480. The panel further determined that
teachers do not lose all First Amendment protection by virtue of their jobs as government
employees and that teachers in particular occupy a unique position within a democracy
committed to the free exchange of ideas. See id at 1480-81 ("The notion that teachers
have no First Amendment rights when teaching, or that the government can censor
teacher speech without restriction, is 'fantastic' and stands in direct contrast to an
imposing line of precedent." (quoting Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1014 (W.D.
Va. 1996)). The panel emphasized that, by claiming that teachers had no First
Amendment rights in the classroom, the defendants had relied on precedents that
disciplined teachers for failing to follow school rules and which depended on the idea that
teachers do not have the unlimited right to control the curriculum. See id. at 1482.
Boring, however, claimed she followed the rules established by Ivey and the school board.
See id
58. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1482. The Supreme Court has noted in several cases that
the First Amendment protects a teacher's in-class speech. See Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality
opinion). The lower courts have also recognized that a teacher's in-class speech is
protected. See, e.g., Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that a law
1967
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The panel chose the Hazelwood analysis, which calls for school
administrators to establish a "legitimate pedagogical concern" for
limiting speech inside the classroom, as the correct test by which to
determine this issue. 9 The panel therefore affirmed the district
professor's in-class speech advocating legalization of marijuana is speech on a matter of
public concern); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting that "teachers
retain their First Amendment right to free speech in school"); Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs.,
944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir. 1991) (acknowledging both that teachers have free speech
rights and that schools "may impose reasonable restrictions" on teacher speech); Dube v.
State Univ., 900 F.2d 587, 598 (2d Cir. 1990) (determining that First Amendment
protection of teacher speech does not allow laws that prevent free debate in the
classroom); Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980)
("[C]lassroom discussion is protected activity."); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist.,
541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating that the "First Amendment's protection of
academic freedom" protects teachers' in-class discussions); James v. Board of Educ., 461
F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 1972) (finding "no sound constitutional basis for the Board's
[decision]" to discharge a teacher who wore a black armband in class to protest the
Vietnam War); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969) (allowing
regulation of teacher classroom speech that is commensurate with the "circumstances of
the utterance"); Scallet, 911 F. Supp. at 1013 ("[T]he First Amendment is routinely
implicated in the classroom .... ); Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137
(N.D. Ill. 1989) ("It is beyond dispute that, to some extent, the First Amendment protects
teachers' expression in the classroom."); Webb v. Lake Mills Community Sch. Dist., 344 F.
Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Iowa 1972) ("Courts have recognized ... some measure of academic
freedom in the classroom .... "); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass.
1971) ("The Fourteenth Amendment recognizes that a public school teacher has... some
measure of academic freedom as to his in-classroom teaching."), affd per curiam, 448 F.2d
1242 (1st Cir. 1971); Hosford v. School Comm., 659 N.E.2d 1178, 1182 (Mass. 1996)
(upholding a teacher's class discussion concerning vulgar language as protected speech).
But see Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) ("Although
a teacher's out-of-class conduct, including her advocacy of particular teaching methods, is
protected, her in-class conduct is not." (citation omitted)).
59. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1482; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. The panel also noted
that several other circuits had chosen to apply the Hazelwood standard to teacher speech.
See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1482 (citing Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1994); Ward, 996 F.2d at 453; Miles, 944 F.2d at 775-76;
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991)). The Hazelwood standard was
deemed appropriate, in part because Hazelwood suggested that "'school officials may
impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of... teachers.' " Id. (quoting Hazelwood,
484 U.S. at 267). The panel noted that the Hazelwood Court also directly stated that its
rationale extended to school control over school-sponsored activities such as theatrical
productions. See id. Therefore, the panel determined that the Hazelwood standard
applied to Boring's choice of a play, since the play was sponsored by the school. See id.
In addition, the "legitimate pedagogical concern" standard allows the school district
to limit teacher speech because it is responsible for determining what materials are
appropriate for the maturity level of the students in question. See id. at 1482-83 (citing
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). Finally, the panel determined that the Hazelwood standard
was appropriate for teacher speech because it recognized that school officials have the
final say over the choice of the curriculum, and that secondary teachers' First Amendment
rights are quite narrow. See id. at 1483. The panel also declined to reach Boring's
alternative argument, which stated that even if the defendants' reasons for limiting her
speech related to legitimate pedagogical concerns, the district court should not have
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court's application of the Hazelwood "legitimate pedagogical
concern" standard to Boring's selection of the play for her drama
class, reversed the district court's dismissal of the case, and remanded
the case to the district court.60
The Fourth Circuit granted rehearing en banc and vacated the
panel opinion on December 3, 1996.61 A seven-to-six decision was
handed down on February 13, 1998, by Judge Widener, largely
duplicating his dissent in the panel opinion.62 Judges Hamilton and
Motz filed dissenting opinions.' Chief Judge Wilkinson and Judge
Luttig wrote concurring opinions.' The en banc majority defined the
issue as whether a secondary teacher in a public school has a First
Amendment right to create the school curriculum by selecting and
producing a play.'s The court affirmed the district court and held that
no such right existed.66
In its analysis, the court first established that the play was part of
dismissed her complaint because she failed to receive adequate notice before her transfer.
See id. at 1483, 1484. The panel decided not to reach this argument at the time because it
remanded the case to the district court for proceedings consistent with its opinion. See id.
60. See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1484-85. In dissent, Judge Widener stated that the only
question before the court was whether Boring's First Amendment rights in selecting the
play were violated. See id. at 1485, 1486 (Widener, J., dissenting). He framed the issue as
a question of who controlled the curriculum: a teacher or school officials. See id. at 1486
(Widener, J., dissenting). Judge Widener disagreed with the majority for two basic
reasons. First, he saw the selection of the play as "nothing more than an ordinary
employment dispute" under the Connick standard and, therefore, lacking First
Amendment protection. Id. at 1487-88 (Widener, J., dissenting). Second, a school play is
part of the school curriculum and, by definition, the curriculum is in and of itself a
legitimate pedagogical concern under the Hazelwood standard. See id. at 1488 (Widener,
J., dissenting). Judge Widener concluded his dissent by stating that school curricula
should be established by school officials who are held publicly accountable via the
electoral process rather than by teachers and federal judges. See id. at 1488-89 (Widener,
J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 1474.
62. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 366; see also supra note 60 (discussing Judge Widener's
dissent). Judges Wilkinson, Russell, Wilkins, Niemeyer, Luttig, and Williams joined in the
en banc majority opinion. See id. at 366.
63. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 374, 375. Judge Hamilton's opinion was joined by Judge
Murnaghan. See id. at 375. Judges Hall, Murnaghan, Ervin, Hamilton, and Michael joined
Judge Motz's dissent. See id. at 380.
64. See id. at 371, 372. Judge Luttig was joined by Judges Wilkins and Williams. See
id. at 374.
65. See id.
66. See id. De novo review is the appropriate standard of review for dismissal for
failure to state a claim. See 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 1356 (2d ed. 1990). All reasonable inferences
should be drawn in favor of the plaintiff, and the allegations in the complaint should be
accepted as true. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367.
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the school curriculum. 67 It relied on definitions from Webster's
Dictionary and the Supreme Court's analysis in Hazelwood, and
concluded that there was no difference between the two definitions. 8
The court then determined that the Supreme Court's analysis in
Connick v. Myers69 should be applied: if the speech in question is not
made by the employee on an issue of public concern, no First
Amendment protections apply.70 The majority determined that the
selection of the play was not a matter of public concern, but merely
"an ordinary employment dispute." As a result, the court held,
Boring had no rights deserving of First Amendment protection.71 The
court cited Fourth Circuit precedent for the general proposition that
Connick was applicable to this type of case.7" The court then relied
heavily on an "indistinguishable" Fifth Circuit case involving a
teacher's unapproved reading list to support its conclusion that public
school teachers have no right to control school curriculum.73 After
holding that Boring had no First Amendment rights, the court stated
that even if such rights did exist, school officials had a legitimate
pedagogical interest in restricting Boring's speech simply because the
play was part of the school curriculum.74
67. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 367-68.
68. See id. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines curriculum as "'3:
all planned school activities including besides courses of study, organized play, athletics,
dramatics, clubs, and homeroom program.'" Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 557 (1971)). The Supreme Court stated in Hazelwood
that activities such as
school sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school ... may fairly be characterized as
part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and
audiences.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271 (1988).
69. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). For further discussion of Connick, see infra notes 120-32 and
accompanying text.
70. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368.
71. Id- When an employee is speaking as "an employee upon matters of personal
interest," then there is no protected expression. IL (citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
72 See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69 (citing DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th
Cir. 1995)).
73. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-69 (citing Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890
F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989)).
74. See id. at 369-70. According to the dictionary definition adopted by the court,
pedagogical means "'2: of or relating to teaching or pedagogy. EDUCATIONAL.'" Id.
at 370 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 1663 (1971)).
The majority dismissed Boring's alternative argument that she was not given notice that
the selection of the play violated any school policies as being "without merit" because the
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The majority then turned to the policy rationale behind its
decision. The court determined that a school's curriculum should be
set by its administration rather than by individual teachers, due to the
malleability of young minds and the overriding public interest that
they not be led astray.75 The court based its policy rationale on the
idea that local school officials are responsible to the public, whereas
teachers are responsible to no one other than school officials and
would be responsible only to judges if the panel's opinion was
adopted.76
Judge Motz's dissent echoed her panel opinion77 and added
several points to that analysis. First, Judge Motz argued that the
majority did not apply the correct standard of review.78 She
emphasized that Boring complied with school rules and requirements
throughout the production and selection of the play, and that the
school administration indicated to Boring that performance of the
play at the state finals, with certain sections deleted, was acceptable.79
Second, Judge Motz believed that Hazelwood, rather than
Connick, provided the proper standard in analyzing the speech at
issue.8 She emphasized that the school board may have had
legitimate pedagogical concerns that would have justified limitations
on Boring's speech, but that the Board would have had to provide
evidence of such concerns before the court could take action of any
sort. The Board, however, failed to provide such evidence.81 The
assertion of the majority that each and every curriculum decision is
"by definition a legitimate pedagogical concern" was not in keeping
majority asserted that Boring had "no First Amendment right to participate in the makeup
of the curriculum." IL at 371 n.2.
75. See id. at 370.
76. See id at 371. The majority seems to suggest that elected school officials are
responsible to the public, but may also be implying that such officials are responsible in
terms of their judgment and ability to choose a suitable curriculum.
77. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Motz's panel
opinion).
78. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 375 (Motz, J., dissenting). The proper standard is de novo,
but Judge Motz believed that the majority did not draw "all reasonable inferences in favor
of the plaintiff," and did not accept "the allegations that are stated in the complaint as
true." Id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
79. See iL at 375-76 (Motz, J., dissenting).
80. See id. at 377 (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz referred to Hazelwood as "the
simpler and more rigorous" analysis. Id. at 378. (Motz, J., dissenting). In addition to the
reasons provided in the panel opinion, Judge Motz stated that Hazelwood was the most
recent Supreme Court decision addressing the First Amendment protections to be
afforded to curricular speech. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
81. See id. at 376 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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with the analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in Hazelwoodf2
In her opinion, a Connick analysis is ill-suited to the "unique
character of a teacher's in-class speech" because it emphasizes that
some restrictions on speech are necessary to preserve workplace
harmony and efficiency, and these concerns are antithetical to a
teacher's role in the classroom.' Therefore, Judge Motz did not
believe that the government interest element in Connick gave school
officials essential control over a teacher's in-class speech.M
Moreover, Judge Motz believed that the majority had
mischaracterized Boring's speech by holding that it was a private
employment dispute, rather than speech on a matter of public
concern. Finally, Motz agreed that school officials must have the
82. Id. (Motz, J., dissenting). As Judge Motz noted, the Court in Hazelwood stated
that there might be times when a curriculum decision may not have a "'valid educational
purpose'" and that on such occasion" 'the First Amendment is so sharply implicate[d] as
to require judicial intervention.'" Id. (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988)). Judge Motz also indicated that neither Kirkland
v. Northside Independent School District, 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989), nor Searcey V.
Harris, 888 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir. 1989), the two cases upon which the majority relied,
supported the majority's holding that all curriculum decisions are legitimate pedagogical
concerns. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 376-77 (Motz, J., dissenting). Judge Motz distinguished
Kirkland on the grounds that the teacher in that case openly defied school rules, whereas
Boring notified Principal Ivey of her choice of the play before providing it to her students.
See iL at 377 (Motz, J., dissenting). In addition, Judge Motz noted that Boring admitted
that school officials maintain authority over the curriculum and may even discipline those
teachers who follow school rules as long as such actions "'are reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.'" Id. (Motz, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood, 484
U.S. at 273). The teacher in Kirkland, on the other hand, declared that he had
"unlimited" control of the curriculum for his class. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). Searcey
also could be distinguished from Boring's case because the school board in Searcey had
provided no evidence to support the reasonableness of its action, thus prompting the
Eleventh Circuit to hold in favor of the teacher. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
83. Boring, 136 F.3d at 377 (Motz, J., dissenting). A teacher's speech "is neither
ordinary employee workplace speech nor common public debate. Any attempt to force it
into either of these categories ignores the essence of teaching-to educate, to enlighten, to
inspire-and the importance of free speech to this most critical endeavor." Id. (Motz, J.,
dissenting) (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality
opinion)).
84. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). In addition, Judge Motz determined that even if the
Connick test were used in this case, it would lead to the same result as Hazelwood: The
district court should not have dismissed Boring's complaint. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting).
She believed that the majority erred in its reading of Connick because of the emphasis
Connick put on the role of the public employee. See id. at 379 (Motz, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court's distinction between an employee speaking as a citizen on a matter of
public concern and an employee speaking on matters of personal interest does not lead to
the conclusion that public employees have no First Amendment rights, Judge Motz
explained. See id. at 379 (Motz, J., dissenting).
85. See id. (Motz, J., dissenting). As in her panel opinion, Judge Motz explained that
Boring claimed school officials transferred her for selecting and producing a play, actions
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final voice in determining a school's curriculum in order to advance a
school's pedagogical objectives, but insisted that teachers have some
First Amendment protection for their in-class speech under Supreme
Court precedent.86
Judge Hamilton's dissent emphasized three points.' First, he
noted that the case was not an "ordinary employment dispute," but
rather a case about a school board, superintendent, and principal who
used Boring as a "shield" to protect the school from the public uproar
against the production of a controversial play.88 Judge Hamilton
believed that Boring had followed all standards promulgated by the
principal, superintendent, and school board but still had lost her
position without explanation from the defendants. 89 Second, Judge
Hamilton restated the main issue in the case as whether the school
board could limit Boring's speech without providing a legitimate
pedagogical concern to justify its decision.9 Because the matter was
before the court at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, rather than on summary
judgment, Judge Hamilton detected no basis for determining whether
a legitimate pedagogical concern was stated by the Board.9'
Therefore, he concluded, dismissal was not appropriate. Finally,
Judge Hamilton asserted that regardless of whether the Fourth
Circuit agreed with the Supreme Court's standard as articulated in
Hazelwood and whether such a standard would force the federal
judiciary into making decisions as to local school curriculum, it must
follow the Supreme Court's Hazelwood standard until the Court
changes its mind or articulates a different standard that requires no
federal intrusion.92
In his concurrence, Chief Judge Wilkinson's primary objection to
the dissenting opinions was that, in his view, they considered
education to be a "federal judicial enterprise" rather than a state or
local function.93 He also expressed concern that the dissents would
that constitute speech on a matter of public concern. See iL at 378-79 (Motz, J.,
dissenting); Boring, 98 F.3d at 1477-78; see also supra notes 55 and 84 (discussing Judge
Motz's characterization of Boring's speech).
86. See Boring, 136 F.3. at 380 (Motz, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 374-75 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). See id. at 366.
88. See iL at 374 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
89. See id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting). Judge Hamilton also noted that the dispute at
issue in this case arose out of public debate and furor over the content of the play.
Therefore, he contended, the Board should have been required to state a legitimate,
pedagogical concern for its decision to transfer Boring. See id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
90. See id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
91. See id. (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
92- See i&. at 374-75 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
93. See id- at 371 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring).
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provide no guidance to local school officials and would strip localities
of democratic means by which to shape their curricula, such as
through elected school boards and student and parent voices in the
process. 4
Judge Luttig's concurrence endorsed the Connick test for
evaluating a teacher's in-class curricular speech and condemned the
dissents' use of the Hazelwood student-based standard as inapplicable
to teacher speech.95 Judge Luttig also distinguished between teacher
in-class curricular speech, which he declared has no First Amendment
protection, and teacher in-class noncurricular speech, which he
argued is protected by the First Amendment. 6 Finally, Judge Luttig
expressed concern that use of the "legitimate pedagogical concern"
standard of Hazelwood would place an enormous burden on local
school officials by forcing them to anticipate the possibility of
litigation in federal court when making curricular decisions and by
placing decisions over school curriculum in the hands of federal
judges as opposed to local parents and school boards. 7
Since 1969, it has been a common principle of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence that teachers and students maintain a measure
of their constitutional privileges within the school environment: "It
can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate."98 Despite this ringing pronouncement, the Court
has never directly addressed the contours of the First Amendment
rights of elementary and secondary teachers in the classroom, so that
the precise bounds of these rights are unclear.99 The lower court
opinions in this area of law rely on two different Supreme Court lines
94. See id. at 371-72 (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring).
95. See id. at 372-73 (Luttig, J., concurring).
96. See id. at 373 (Luttig, J., concurring).
97. See id. at 373-74 (Luttig, J., concurring).
98. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969). The
Supreme Court held in Tinker that students had the right to wear black armbands to
school in protest of the Vietnam War so long as such symbolic speech did not" 'materially
and substantially interfere'" with learning or discipline in the educational environment.
Id. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th Cir. 1966)). The Tinker Court
noted that school officials "cannot suppress 'expressions of feelings with which they do not
wish to contend.'" Id. at 511 (quoting Burnside, 363 F.2d at 749). The Hazelwood Court
distinguished Tinker on the grounds that Tinker involved "a student's personal expression
that happened to occur on school premises," as opposed to "school-sponsored ...
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to
bear the imprimatur of the school." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271
(1988).
99. See Clarick, supra note 2, at 696.
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of precedent. 10 The first line of precedent is the result of a
combination of three cases: Pickering v. Board of Education,''
Connick v. Myers," 2 and Mount Healthy City School District v.
Doyle.'03 The second line stems from the Court's more recent
decision in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.'1
The Pickering-Connick-Mount Healthy analysis was developed in
the context of a government employee who speaks out, either in
public or private, on a matter that threatens the efficiency and
workings of the government employer.0 5  Courts applying the
100. Some lower courts have combined the two lines of precedent, thus possibly
creating yet a third line of precedent. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text for
discussion of these "combination" cases.
101. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
102. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
103. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
104. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
105. See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664, 681-82 (plurality opinion) (1994)
(remanding to the trial court the discharge of a nurse who allegedly commented to a co-
worker that hospital policy endangered patient care and who ostensibly criticized her
supervisor); Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 (upholding the firing of an assistant district attorney
for distributing questionnaire concerning office morale and politics to colleagues);
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75 (overturning the dismissal of a teacher who sent a letter to a
local newspaper that criticized school board policies). The lower courts' application of the
Connick-Pickering test has led to conflicting results, uncertainty, and confusion as to what
constitutes speech on a matter of public concern; such uncertainty is problematic because
it has the effect of chilling public employee speech. See generally Joan M. Eagle, First
Amendment Protection for Teachers Who Criticize Academic Policy: Biting the Hand that
Feeds You, 60 CM.-KENT L. REV. 229 (1984) (reviewing lower federal court decisions
applying Connick-Pickering to teacher speech criticizing academic policy and evaluating
the weight given to various factors in the analysis); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech
and Public Concern: A Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court's Threshold Approach to
Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 121 (1996) (arguing that the
public concern threshold step creates inconsistent results and should be replaced by a
direct balancing test); R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and
Concern, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 27 (1987) (acknowledging the uncertainty created by lower
courts' application of Connick-Pickering but suggesting that a different test would lead to
the same problems and that courts should approach public employee free speech more
pragmatically); Mike Harper, Note, Connick v. Myers and the First Amendment Rights of
Public Employees, 16 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 525 (1994) (arguing that the public
concern threshold step is flawed and proposing speaker motive as a new standard); Karin
B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better Definition of the
Pickering/Conick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993 (1997) (criticizing the public
concern threshold prong of Pickering-Connick and suggesting a new definition of public
concern based on whether speech is made to the public); Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Comment,
Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern
Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109 (1988) (calling for a public concern threshold step to
be replaced by a test that asks whether a government function has been impaired by
employee speech); D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond "Public Concern": New Free
Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249 (1990) (proposing a new
threshold test based on whether public employee speech is "related to employment");
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standards from these cases have determined that when a teacher-a
government employee-is speaking as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, her speech is protected under the First Amendment,0 6 but
when she is speaking as a government employee about her own
personal interest, her speech is not protected.Y07 Pickering v. Board of
Education,208 which provided the foundation for the analytical
framework that the Court constructed to analyze public employee
free speech cases, was augmented by the Court's decisions in Connick
and Mount Healthy. The Court's framework requires that the
plaintiff-employee prove both that the speech is constitutionally
protected'0 9 and that the speech was a motivating or substantial factor
in the adverse employment action."0 If the employee can prove these
elements of her case, then the employer must be allowed to
demonstrate that the employee would have been fired regardless of
her speech."'
In order to be protected under the First Amendment, the speech
in question must meet two requirements: it must involve a matter of
public concern" 2 and the employee's interests in his speech must
Paul Ferris Solomon, Editorial Note, The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A
Proposal for a Fresh Start, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 449 (1986) (criticizing Connick and
suggesting that a public interest focus be added to the current balancing test).
106. See Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that a lav
professor's in-class speech advocating legalization of marijuana was a matter of public
concern); Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (5th Cir. 1980)
(holding that a classroom simulation of Reconstruction Era events was protected speech);
Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (determining that a
university professor's classroom speech advocating diversity was protected).
107. See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a basketball coach's use of the word "nigger" was not speech on a matter of public
concern); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating
that a high school teacher's supplemental reading list was not protected speech); Fowler v.
Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 663 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that a film shown to students
was unprotected speech because the film was not "expressive or communicative" in
nature); Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a college
professor's use of profanity in the classroom was not speech on a matter of public
concern); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1972) (determining that disputes
with colleagues about course content and counseling were not protected).
108. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
109. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385-87 (1987); Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-
48; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
110. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
111. See id. In addition, the employer must determine, through a reasonable
investigation, what was actually said; therefore, the framework will be applied to the
speech as the employer believed it to be based on his investigation. See Waters v.
Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 679-80 (1994).
112 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47 (setting out public concern standard and holding
that assistant district attorney's distribution of questionnaire concerning office politics and
morale was not speech on an issue of public concern); see also Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 386
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outweigh the interests of the government employer in efficiently
providing a public service and in maintaining a workplace free from
disruptions." The employee bears the burden of proof on both of
these issues."4
In Pickering, a public school teacher was dismissed after he sent
a letter to the local media denouncing the school board's decision to
fund athletic programs before allotting money to academic
initiatives."5  The Court held that the discharge impermissibly
infringed on the teacher's First Amendment rights, repudiating the
idea that in the interest of preserving the harmony and efficiency of
government as an institution, public employees should give up all free
speech rights they possess as citizens to "comment on matters of
public interest.""' 6 The Court acknowledged that the employee's
right to expression must be balanced against the government agency's
duties to the public in providing efficient public service."7 Because it
would be impossible for employers to anticipate all the possible
circumstances in which a public employee's speech might be at issue,
the Court listed three factors that should be examined in such cases." 8
These factors have been described by one commentator as: "(1) the
parties' working relationship; (2) the detrimental effect of the speech
on the employer; and (3) the nature of the issue on which the
employee spoke and the relationship of the employee to that issue."" 9
Although Pickering indicated that public concern was a basis for
protecting public employees' speech, Connick modified the Court's
(1987) (holding that employee's comment on the attempted Reagan assassination was
speech on a matter of public concern); Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439
U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (determining that a teacher's private conversations with her
principal may constitute protected speech and that the nature of the conversation is not
determinative in the public concern analysis); Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 284 (stating that
a teacher's call to a radio station concerning the school district's dress code for teachers
was protected speech); Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574-75 (holding that a teacher's letter to
local media criticizing school board policy was speech on a matter of public concern);
supra notes 105-07 (discussing the lower courts' confusion as to what public concern
means and providing examples of courts' public concern analyses with respect to teacher
speech). See generally Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to
Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. LU. 43 (1988) (discussing the lower
courts' application of the public concern test and seeking to identify factors that courts
find determinative in making a public concern evaluation).
113. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
114. See Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287.
115. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564.
116. Id. at 568.
117. See id.
118. See id. at 569-70.
119. Stephen Allred, The School Employee's Right of Free Speech, in 2 EDUCATION
LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA 29-1,29-2 (Janine Murphy ed., 1998).
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analysis to make public concern the threshold step in determining
whether the speech at issue falls under First Amendment
protection. 20 Shelia Myers, an assistant district attorney in New
Orleans who objected to her transfer to a different section of the
court, decided to investigate employee dissatisfaction within the
district attorney's office.' She prepared and distributed a
questionnaire to fifteen other assistant district attorneys.'2 Later that
afternoon, the district attorney informed her that she was being
dismissed because she had refused to accept the transfer and that her
distribution of the questionnaire was insubordination.1'3 The
Supreme Court held that one of the questions in the questionnaire
pertained to an issue of public concern, but that Myers' actions
constituted an employee grievance.124 Her dismissal, therefore, did
not violate the First Amendment.'2
As the Court remarked in Connick, speech on a matter of public
concern is expression on "any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community.' ' 26 Whether an employee's expression is
considered to be a matter of public concern "must be determined by
the content, form, and context" of the speech. 27  In this
determination, the analysis of the speech's content generally
supersedes questions of form and context.'
In Connick, the Court placed the Pickering test second in the
analysis, after resolution of the public concern issue. 29  The Court
warned that without the balancing test, employees might challenge
120. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146-47 (1983).
121. See id. at 140-41. Myers had been employed as an assistant district attorney for
five and a half years at the time of her proposed transfer and had "competently performed
her responsibilities." Id. at 140. She discussed her opposition to the transfer with Harry
Connick, the district attorney, and with several other supervisors, but was told the transfer
would proceed despite her concerns. See id.
122. See id. at 141. The questionnaire asked for views regarding "office transfer policy,
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors,
and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." Id.
123. See id.
124. See iL at 154.
125. See id.
126. Id. at 146. In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410
(1979), the Court held that speech could be considered a matter of public concern even
when a public employee expresses her concerns privately with her government employer
rather than publicly. See id. at 416-17.
127. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
128. See Arvinger v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir.
1988) ("Although the Connick court did not elaborate on the relative weight to be
accorded these three factors, this court has held that 'content, subject-matter, is always the
central aspect.' "(quoting Jackson v. Bair, 851 F.2d 714, 720 (4th Cir. 1988))).
129. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
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ordinary personnel decisions as free speech violations, restricting the
ability of government agencies to function effectively.13 The primary
government interest to be weighed in the balancing test is the
efficient operation of its public responsibilities.' To enable the
government to fulfill its duties, the judiciary should refrain from
intruding in the internal affairs of government offices.'
In Mount Healthy, a school board determined that an untenured
public school teacher's contract would not be renewed after he called
a radio station to express his displeasure with the enactment of a
teacher dress code. 33 The teacher, however, alleged that the
nonrenewal of his contract violated his First Amendment rights."
The Court held that the radio station call constituted speech on a
matter of public concern and that Pickering applied to the case. 35
The Court then added a twist to its previous analysis, making the
teacher's burden of proving a First Amendment violation more
difficult. The Court established that the burden of proof falls on the
employee to explain that: (1) he was practicing constitutionally
protected expression; and (2) this conduct was a pivotal element in
the decision to discipline him. 36 If the employee can prove both
elements, he has established a prima facie case. 37 The burden then
shifts to the employer to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the termination would have occurred whether or not the
protected activity had taken place. 38 Thus, in order for the school
board in Mount Healthy to win the case, it had to prove that the
teacher's contract would not have been renewed regardless of
130. See id. at 144. The Connick Court emphasized that the purpose of free speech was
to provide for an exchange of ideas to bring about "' "political and social changes desired
by the people."' " Id. at 145 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269
(1964) (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957))).
131. See id. at 150-51. The Court was concerned with the effect that employee speech
would have on "'discipline and morale [and harmony] in the workplace.'" Id. at 151
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part) (quoting Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)). The Court also noted that the
employer did not need to wait for actual disruption of office efficiency to occur before
taking action against the employee. See id. at 152.
132. See id. at 146. A restricted view of public concern prevents every statement made
by a public employee from becoming a constitutional issue. See id. at 149.
133. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977). The board
added that its decision also was based on the teacher's inappropriate conduct in using
obscene gestures to deal with students. See id. at 281.
134. See id at 276.
135. See id. at 284.
136. See id. at 287.
137. See id.
138. See id.
1979
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whether the teacher called the radio station because his
unprofessional conduct provided the true justification for his
dismissal.3 9
In contrast to the Pickering, Connick, and Mount Healthy line of
cases that developed to analyze public employee speech rights,
Hazelwood is the Court's definitive statement regarding the speech
rights of students. The Hazelwood standard holds that classroom
speech may be regulated by school officials as long as the regulations
are reasonably related to pedagogical concerns. 40  Hazelwood
involved school censorship of two student-written articles in a high
139. See Allred, supra note 119, at 29-3. The Supreme Court most recently added to its
analytical framework in Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994), when it determined that
an employer's reasonable investigation into the nature and content of an employee's
speech should determine what the speech actually was. See id. at 677-78 (plurality
opinion). In Waters, a factual dispute existed as to whether the plaintiff, a nurse who was
dismissed from her job at a public hospital for negative comments to a co-worker about
her working conditions, spoke out about her problems with her superior or about the
quality of care provided by the hospital to its patients. See id. at 664-66 (plurality
opinion). The Court stated in a plurality opinion that both the Connick public concern
threshold and the Pickering balancing test should be applied to the speech as the
government employer understood its content and meaning. See id. at 681-82 (plurality
opinion). As Justice Souter pointed out in his concurring opinion, the plurality opinion in
Waters may be taken to state the holding of the Court because "[a] majority of the Court
agrees that employers whose conduct survives the plurality's reasonableness test cannot be
held constitutionally liable" and "a majority is of the view that employers whose conduct
fails the plurality's reasonableness test have violated the Free Speech Clause." Id. at 685
(Souter, J., concurring). Additionally, the Court held that the employer must conduct a
reasonable investigation into the circumstances surrounding the employee's conduct. See
id. at 678 (plurality opinion). When more than one course of action might be reasonable,
"[o]nly procedures outside the range of what a reasonable manager would use may be
condemned as unreasonable." Id. (plurality opinion). Whether the employer's
investigation is reasonable should be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering the
cost of the procedure, the relative risk of punishing protected speech, the erroneous
exculpation of unprotected speech, and the employer's interest in achieving its goals as
efficiently as possible. See id. at 677-78 (plurality opinion). Although no First
Amendment cases involving teachers have applied a Waters analysis, Waters is important
because the Court recognized for the first time that First Amendment protections also
must be applied through reasonable procedures. See Stephen Allred, Supreme Court
Revises Free Speech Test for Public Employees, 58 Loc. GOV'T BULL. 1, 1-4 (1994).
140. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988); see also Silano v.
Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he Court has also
recognized that public schools may limit classroom speech to promote educational
goals."); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that a school can
"regulate a teacher's classroom speech if ... the regulation is reasonably related to a
legitimate pedagogical concern"); Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 775 (10th Cir.
1991) (" '[S]chool officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students,
teachers, and other members of the school community.' "(quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at
267)); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004, 1008 (7th Cir. 1990)("[A]n individual teacher has no right to ignore the directives of duly appointed education
authorities" concerning teaching methods.).
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school newspaper. The paper was written and edited by a journalism
class at the school. 141 While reviewing the newspaper prior to its
spring publication, the school principal decided to remove articles
concerning students' experiences with teenage pregnancy and the
effects of divorce on students. 4 In holding for the school board, the
Court stated that "educators do not offend the First Amendment by
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns."' 43
The Court based its holding on a public forum analysis,' determining
that if school officials reserved school facilities for purposes other
than general public use, no public forum has been created. 45 Once a
court establishes the absence of a public forum, then school officials
may place "reasonable restrictions" on the speech of both students
and teachers. 46
Because Hazelwood dealt with student speech, the court was
primarily concerned with school officials' authority over school-
141. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. The paper was distributed to school students,
faculty, and staff, as well as to various members of the community. See id. Sales of the
paper produced $1166.84, while printing the paper cost $4668.50. See id. The school
board subsidized these printing costs in addition to providing supplies, textbooks, and a
journalism teacher to teach the class. See id. at 262-63.
142- See id. at 263. The principal always received and inspected the page proofs before
the newspaper was printed and distributed. See id. The principal objected to the
pregnancy story because he was concerned that the pregnant students might be identified
by other students, even though false names were used. See id. The divorce story featured
a student interview that included negative comments by the student about her father, to
which the principal thought the father should have been able to respond before the article
was published. See id. Because the principal did not believe that students had time to
make the necessary changes in order for the paper to be published before the end of the
school year, he decided to pull the articles completely. See id. at 263-64.
143. ld. at 273.
144. The public forum analysis bases the government's regulation of the speech in
question on the nature of the forum in which the speech takes place. See Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-47 (1983). If the property on which
the speech took place is a public forum (e.g., public streets and parks), government
restrictions on speech are subject to higher scrutiny. See id. at 55; see also Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1782-84 (1987) (arguing that the public forum doctrine impedes
meaningful First Amendment analysis and suggesting a reformulation of the doctrine);
Marc Rohr, Freedom of Speech After Justice Brennan, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 413,
477-89 (1993) (discussing the division among the Justices over the public forum doctrine
and the use of the doctrine to uphold restrictive speech); Helene Bryks, Comment, A
Lesson in School Censorship: Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 291, 304-09
(1989) (describing the three types of public fora identified by the Court in Perry and
arguing that public forum analysis should not be applied to curricular speech).
145. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
146. See id.
1981
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sponsored "expressive activities" that "the public might reasonably
perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school." 147  Such activities
could be considered part of the curriculum of the school whether or
not the activities take place within the classroom as long as faculty
members supervise the activities with the purpose of conveying
certain knowledge or skills to students. 148  The Supreme Court
justified greater educator control over school-sponsored student
speech on the grounds that educators are empowered to insure that
students understand the information the lesson is created to impart,
that the material is age-appropriate, and that the individual's views
are not perceived by others to be those of the school.149 In addition,
the Court specifically mentioned that a school must be allowed to
censor speech that "might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug
or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent
with 'the shared values of a civilized social order,' or to associate the
school with any position other than neutrality on matters of political
controversy,"15 so that the school can meet its obligations to nurture
or develop students' cultural values and to aid students in making a
normal adjustment to society.' When a school's restriction on
student speech "has no valid educational purpose," however, then the
courts must intervene to provide First Amendment protection of
student rights.52
147. Id. at 271.
148. See id. The Supreme Court distinguished Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969), recognizing that Hazelvood
concerned student speech that others may perceive to be sponsored by the school, whereas
the wearing of a black armband in Tinker was simply a student's personal expression that
happened to occur on school grounds. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71; infra notes 155-
58 and accompanying text (discussing Tinker).
149. See id. at 271. The Court later indicated that the school must be allowed to
consider "the emotional maturity of the intended audience." Id. at 272. Examples of
reasonable limitations on speech include speech that would substantially disrupt the
school environment or affect the rights of students at the school, as well as speech that
would reflect poorly on the school's teaching of written communication skills and social
values. See id. at 271 ("[A] school may... 'disassociate itself' ... from speech that is, for
example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced,
vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences." (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No.
403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))).
150. Id. at 272 (citation omitted) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 683 (1986)).
151. See id. (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,493 (1954)).
152. Id. at 273. As Justice Brennan noted in dissent, "mere incompatibility with the
school's pedagogical message" was not a "constitutionally sufficient justification for the
suppression of student speech." Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, the
"'mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint,' or an unsavory subject does not justify official suppression of
student speech in the high school." Id. at 281. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
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Although some courts have used one line of precedent or the
other, other courts have combined the Hazelwood and Connick-
Pickering-Mount Healthy analyses, using the Connick "public
concern" test as a threshold to determine whether teachers' curricular
speech is protected under the First Amendment before moving to the
legitimate pedagogical concerns analysis.5 3 Cases that have involved
the exercise of speech pertaining to religious beliefs have been
decided by both the Supreme Court and the lower courts on religious
freedom grounds.154 Finally, some courts have relied on a rational
basis test to determine whether a teacher's in-class speech is
protected, asking whether the teacher's speech was a " 'material and
substantial'" interference with the activity of the school. 5 5 This test
(quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509). Lower courts also have relied on earlier Supreme Court
precedent to determine what types of behavior by school officials overstep First
Amendment boundaries. In Borger v. Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Wis. 1995), for
example, a federal district court held that school officials violate the First Amendment
when access to materials is restricted because the school officials disapprove of the ideas
contained within them. See id at 99-100 (citing Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 879-
80 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
153. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368-70; Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d
794, 797-802 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying Connick to determine that a teacher's supplemental
reading test was not a matter of public concern and using Hazelwood to justify holding
that teachers do not solely control the curriculum); see also infra notes 169-74 and
accompanying text (discussing the lower courts' approaches to analyzing teacher
classroom speech).
154. See, e.g., Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994).
Peloza, a high school biology teacher, sued his school board for violating his First
Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression when it "forced" him to teach
evolution. See id. at 519. Peloza characterized "evolutionism" as "an historical,
philosophical and religious belief system, but not a valid scientific theory." Id. The Ninth
Circuit determined that no Establishment Clause violation had occurred because
evolutionism is not a religion. See id. at 521. The court also dismissed Peloza's free speech
claims on the grounds that allowing him to mention his religious beliefs to students at
school during school hours would be a violation of the Establishment Clause because
students might consider his views to be sanctioned by the school. See id. at 522.
155. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,749 (5th Cir.
1966)); see also Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying the
Tinker test when in-class speech was not considered to be part of the school curriculum);
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566,571 (2d Cir. 1972) ("Any limitation on the exercise
of constitutional rights can be justified only by a conclusion ... that the interests of
discipline or sound education are materially and substantially jeopardized, whether the
danger stems initially from the conduct of students or teachers."); Dean v. Timpson Indep.
Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 308 (E.D. Tex. 1979) (requiring that a teacher's classroom
speech cause a "material or substantial disruption" to justify school board regulation of
that teacher's academic freedom); Parducci v. Rutland, 326 F. Supp. 352, 355 (M.D. Ala.
1970) (holding that the "material and substantial disruption" test should be applied to a
teacher's choice of classroom materials). One court applied a strict scrutiny standard to a
school board's decision to discharge a teacher for wearing a black armband in class to
protest the Vietnam War. See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir. 1972)
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was drawn from the Supreme Court's decision in Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School District,156 which dealt with
student symbolic speech.157 In addition, the application of both types
of analyses has been inconsistent since some courts using a Connick-
Pickering analysis find classroom speech to be a matter of public
concern while others do not.
At least one federal district court also has suggested that a
student's right to hear under the First Amendment may serve as a
justification for protecting a teacher's right to speak or use certain
materials in class because the protection of teacher classroom speech
is primarily for the good of the student and of the community. 5 9 That
court reasoned that a school's duty to expose students to diverse
thought requires that a teacher be given some academic freedom
within the classroom. 160 The court denied the teacher's motion for a
preliminary injunction, however, because it determined under the
legitimate pedagogical concerns test that the teacher's showing of an
R-rated film would likely be considered inappropriate by the school
board.'
Other courts, including the Supreme Court in Board of
Education v. Pico,62 have indicated that a student's right to be
exposed to information is a factor to be considered in judging the
constitutionality of a school board's actions to remove books from a
("The question we must ask in every first amendment case is whether the regulatory policy
is drawn as narrowly as possible to achieve the social interests that justify it...
156. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
157. See id. at 509.
158. See W. Stuart Stuller, The Conundrum of Academic Freedom, INQUIRY &
ANALYSIS: BIMONTHLY PUBLICATION NSBA COUNCIL SCH. ATr'ys, May 1998, at 1, 2
(citing Boring, 136 F.3d at 368; Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005 (2d Cir. 1994)).
159. See Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (N.D. Ill. 1989); cf. Seyfried
v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1981) (suggesting that when the school
superintendent banned production of a school musical, student objections to "overly
narrow or ideological curriculum-related decisions" might have been justified by students'
"freedom to hear" and their First Amendment rights to be exposed to ideas); Borger v.
Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 99-100 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (stating that students are free to
challenge school board curriculum decisions, but in order to establish a First Amendment
violation they must prove that the school officials have engaged in viewpoint
discrimination).
160. See Krizek, 713 F. Supp. at 1137. The court also emphasized that it did not matter
whether students or teachers brought a First Amendment academic freedom claim. See id.
at 1138 n.4.
161. See id. at 1143. The teacher showed the film About Last Night to her eleventh
grade English class as a modem parallel to Thornton Wilder's Our Town. Students were
told they would be excused from the assignment if they or their parents found the film
offensive. See id. at 1132-33.
162. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
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school library.63 The Pico Court held in a plurality opinion that a
school board cannot remove books from a school library simply
because the board dislikes or is uncomfortable with the ideas
contained in those books."6  The Court underscored that school
board control over the curriculum is subject to First Amendment
limits in order to teach children the values of free speech and open
debate. 65 According to the plurality, free speech includes " 'the right
to receive information and ideas.' "166 The right to receive is based on
both the speaker's right to send ideas and serves as a predicate to the
recipient's right to exercise his own free speech.167 The Court in Pico,
however, emphasized the narrowness of its holding and specifically
distinguished between the school board's control over the classroom
curriculum and the removal of books from the school library.168
Because there have been no Supreme Court cases dealing
specifically with teachers' in-class speech, the lower courts have used
a variety of approaches to determine the classroom speech rights of
teachers. Many lower courts have embraced the "legitimate
pedagogical concern" standard originally devised to deal with student
speech.69 Some courts have established a two-part test: first, the
163. See id. at 867-69 (plurality opinion); see also Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch.
Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Secondary school students certainly retain an
interest in some freedom of the classroom, if only through the qualified 'freedom to hear'
.... "); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 1976) (stating
that if a teacher decided to use a school library book in a classroom discussion, "the First
Amendment's protection of academic freedom would protect [the teacher's right to
discuss the book] and the students' right to hear").
164. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 872 (plurality opinion).
165. See id. at 863-66 (plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 867 (plurality opinion) (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969)).
167. See id. (plurality opinion).
168. See iL at 862-63 (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens is the only member of the
plurality who currently sits on the Court. The other Justices who remain on the Court
from 1982, then-Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, dissented from the plurality
opinion. See id. at 904 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. at 921 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist also stated that "the very existence of a right to receive information, in
the junior high school and high school setting [is] ... wholly unsupported by our past
decisions and inconsistent with the necessarily selective process of elementary and
secondary education." Id. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
169. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir.
1998); Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722 (2d Cir.
1994); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944
F.2d 773, 778 (10th Cir. 1991); Webster v. New Lenox Sch. Dist. No. 122, 917 F.2d 1004,
1008 (7th Cir. 1990); Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 1989); Borger v.
Bisciglia, 888 F. Supp. 97, 100 (E.D. Wis. 1995); Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp.
1131, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Board of Educ. v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 701 (Colo. 1998) (en
bane). But see Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying the
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school's pedagogical interests must be identified and evaluated as to
their legitimacy; second, the school's actions must reasonably relate
to the pedagogical interests which it has identified. In addition,
some courts also examine whether there is a non-public forum before
applying the Hazelwood test.'7' Other courts have specifically stated
the factors to be considered when determining whether a regulation is
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns 2 and have
added to the Hazelwood test by considering additional standards
depending on the facts involved. 73 Finally, at least two courts have
used the Hazelwood test as a replacement for the public concern
threshold step in the Mount Healthy framework: to determine the
extent to which a teacher's in-class speech is protected under the First
Amendment. 7 4
An example of a "typical" Hazelwood analysis can be shown by
considering the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Miles v.
Denver Public Schools, a case in which a tenured teacher was
placed on four days paid administrative leave for comments he made
to a class concerning the quality of the school. 76 The court chose to
Connick-Pickering line of cases to a professor's in-class speech); Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd.
of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172, 1176 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying Pickering to a teacher's use of
Learnball, a classroom management technique utilizing sports concepts, student rule-
making exercises, and a rewards system); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d
794, 797 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying the Connick-Pickering line of cases to a teacher's use of
his own supplementary reading list); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D.
Va. 1996), affd, 106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997) (applying Pickering, with reservation, to the
in-class speech of a university professor).
170. See Lacks, 147 F.3d at 724; Silano, 42 F.3d at 722; Miles, 944 F.2d at 778; Webster,
917 F.2d at 1008; Searcey, 888 F.2d at 1318-19; Borger, 888 F. Supp. at 100; Wilder, 960
P.2d at 701.
171. See Miles, 944 F.2d at 775-76.
172. See Ward, 996 F.2d at 453 (identifying "the age and sophistication of the students,
the relationship between teaching method and valid educational objective, and the context
and manner of the presentation" as relevant factors).
173. See id. at 452 (creating a second analytical step that requires a school to provide a
teacher with notice as to prohibited in-class conduct); Krizek, 713 F. Supp. at 1142-43
(stating that the reasonableness of a school district's action in not renewing a teacher's
contract depends on a reasonable relationship of legitimate pedagogical concerns and the
severity of the sanction used).
174. See Ward, 996 F.2d at 452; Miles, 944 F.2d at 775. In Hosford v. School
Committee, 659 N.E.2d 1178 (Mass. 1996), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
determined under Mount Healthy that the school board impermissibly punished a teacher
for a class discussion with her students, that the discussion was protected and was a
motivating factor in the board's decision not to renew her contract. See id. at 1181-82.
175. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
176. See id. at 774. The speech at issue, although in class, was not considered to be
curricular because it was not related to a particular lesson. The teacher stated during his
ninth grade government class that the school had been declining in quality since 1967. See
id. One of the examples the teacher gave for his statement referred to a rumor that two
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use the Hazelwood standard to determine whether the speech was
constitutionally protected under the first prong of the Mount Healthy
analysis.'" The court stated that the first step in the analysis required
it to decide whether Miles's classroom was a public forum; the court
reasoned that an ordinary classroom could not be a public forum
because the Supreme Court decided in Hazelwood that a school
newspaper was not a public forum.178 The second step in the analysis
was to ascertain whether the speech at issue " '[bore] the imprimatur
of the school.' "179 The court again analogized to Hazelwood: if a
school newspaper "'[bore] the imprimatur of the school,'" then so
must a teacher's in-class comments.8 0 After proceeding through this
analysis, the court determined that the Pickering test was not
applicable because it did not address the state's interest as an
educator and only dealt with the state's interest as an employer.'8' In
applying the Hazelwood test instead, the court determined that the
school had legitimate pedagogical interests in Miles's remarks and
also that the paid administrative leave and letter of reprimand
promoted the interests of the school system and were reasonably
related to those interests."
Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free School District' provides an
example of a court's application of the Hazelwood test to the use of
classroom materials."8 George Silano, a guest speaker for a tenth
grade math class and also a school board member, used film clips to
students had been engaged in sexual intercourse on the tennis court during lunch the
previous day. See id. Parents of the alleged participants complained to the principal about
the comment. See id. In addition to the forced administrative leave, a reprimand letter
was placed in the teacher's file. See id.
177. See id. at 775-76.
178. See id. at 776.
179. Id. (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271 (1988)).
180. Id. (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271). Some courts have declined to apply
Hazelwood to professors' speech in a college or university classroom. See Scallet v.
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (using the Pickering analysis for in-
class professor speech because "the cases in which the Hazelwood test is employed do not
address the in-class speech of teachers at the university or graduate school level"), affd,
106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1010 (7th Cir. 1994)
(applying the Connick-Pickering line of cases without mentioning Hazelwood). But see
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1074 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying Hazelwood to a
professor's in-class speech and concluding that academic freedom is not an independent
First Amendment right).
181. See Miles, 944 F.2d at 776-77. The court noted that the special characteristics of
the classroom required the application of Hazelwood, as did the fact that a teacher's
expression in other environments might not be perceived as school-sponsored. See id.
182. See id. at 778-79.
183. 42 F.3d 719 (2d Cir. 1994).
184. See id. at 721.
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explain the "persistence of vision" theory; one of the clips portrayed
two women and one man naked above their waists.185  The
superintendent of the schools subsequently barred Silano from
visiting any of the schools within the school system for the remainder
of the school year, and the school board censured him.86 Silano filed
suit alleging a violation of his First Amendment free speech rights.,
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied a "legitimate
pedagogical concerns" analysis to Silano's use of the film clip because
his lecture took place in a classroom and was intended to provide
knowledge to the students in the class."s The court then determined
that the actions of the superintendent and school board were
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. 9 The court
declined Silano's invitation to apply the Pico test, which provided that
school officials could not remove resources from the school library
merely because they disagreed with the ideas contained in those
materials. The court justified its decision by explaining that according
to Hazelwood, activities supervised by school officials to provide
knowledge to students are considered part of a school's curriculum.19
A third example of a court's application of the Hazelwood test
can be found in Ward v. Hickey,'9' a First Circuit Court of Appeals
case in which a school board decided not to rehire a teacher after a
parent reported the teacher's discussion of abortion of Down's
Syndrome fetuses in her ninth grade biology- class.192 The court
determined that in order for the teacher to prove a free speech
violation, she had to show that her discussion of abortion was
protected under the First Amendment and that the discussion was a
substantial factor in the board's decision not to renew her contract. 93
The teacher's speech was subject to school board regulation in light of
the board's control over curriculum as long as the regulations were
"reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical concern" and the
school gave the teacher notice of the conduct or speech that was
185. See id. Silano did not direct the students' attention to this particular clip. See id.
186. See id.
187. See id. at 722.
188. See id. at 722-23. The court noted that although Silano was a guest in the
classroom, his speech was entitled to no greater protection than that which would be given
a teacher. See id. at 723.
189. See id.
190. See id. Library resources, on the other hand, may be viewed by students
voluntarily and are not required reading. See id.
191. 996 F.2d 448 (1st Cir. 1993).
192. See id. at 450.
193. See id. at 452 (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977)).
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prohibited.94 The court established that a teacher's in-class speech is
part of the curriculum and subject to limitations by the school
board.195 The court further noted, however, that a school board
cannot take action against teacher speech that it never attempted to
prevent or regulate in the first place. 96 If a school board could take
action without providing notice to teachers, the court reasoned that
teachers would be afraid to teach, which would chill free debate and
First Amendment rights within the classroom.Y7 The proper test for
notice is whether a school could reasonably expect a teacher to know
that his speech was prohibited "based on existing regulations,
policies, discussions, and other forms of communication" between
school officials and teachers. 98 The court held against the teacher in
Ward, however, because the teacher had waived her right to a
determination on the notice issue.199
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hazelwood, the vast
majority of teachers alleging violation of their First Amendment
rights in the classroom won their claims."0 Most pre-Hazelwood
cases that held for teachers who had been discharged or whose
contracts were not renewed as a result of inappropriate in-class
behavior placed emphasis on the teachers' professional judgment and
rights to academic freedom in the classroom.2° These decisions also
194. Id. (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,273 (1988); Keyishian
v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589,604 (1967)).
195. See id. at 453. The court noted that it had granted schools "great deference in
regulating classroom speech." Id. at 452. The factors the court considered in determining
the reasonableness of school regulations included "circumstances such as age and
sophistication of students, relationship between teaching method and valid educational
objectives, and context and manner of presentation." Id.
196. See id. at 453.
197. See id.
198. Id. at 454.
199. See id. at 454-55. The teacher did not argue that the school board could not limit
her discussion of abortion in advance. See id. at 454.
200. See Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds
sub non. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Kingsville
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980); James v. Board of Educ. of
Cent. Dist. No. 1, 461 F.2d 566 (2nd Cir. 1972); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.
1969); Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Tex. 1979); Moore v.
Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973); Webb v. Lake Mills
Community Sch. Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep.
Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 496 F.2d 92 (5th
Cir. 1974); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass), aff'd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242
(1st Cir. 1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
201. See, e.g., Keefe, 418 F.2d at 362 (determining that assigning high school seniors to
read and then discuss a magazine article containing an obscenity was within a teacher's
academic freedom rights); Dean, 486 F. Supp. at 307 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967), for the proposition that the academic freedom concept protects a
1989
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turned on either the fact that school officials had no policy
prohibiting the teacher's conduct or that the school officials were
unhappy with a particular assignment or discussion that the teacher
used to engage the class.202  Some cases, particularly post-Tinker
decisions, emphasized the appropriateness of the controversial
content for the students who had heard or read it.2 3 One case was
upheld on the grounds that a teacher's speech in a class discussion-
characterized by the school board as "private expression"-was
protected.204
In pre-Hazelwood cases in which a teacher lost his claim, the
school authorities had valid grounds to support the teacher's dismissal
or nonrenewal.2  One case used a Pickering standard to determine
teacher's right to use the teaching method she chooses, even if the material is unpopular or
controversial); Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1390 (upholding a teacher's academic freedom to
choose a teaching method that "served a demonstrated educational purpose"); Parducci,
316 F. Supp. at 355 (holding that a teacher's academic freedom was violated when the
school board dismissed her for assigning to high school juniors a short story that contained
vulgar language).
202. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 541-42 (10th Cir. 1979); see also
Stachura, 763 F.2d at 215 (holding that a teacher's speech rights were violated when the
teacher was discharged for using teacher materials and methods that previously had been
approved by his principal); Moore, 357 F. Supp. at 1040-41 (stating that a student teacher's
discharge after engaging in a spontaneous class discussion about evolution was
unconstitutional because none of the school's standards prohibited such conduct); Webb,
344 F. Supp. at 804 (holding that a teacher could not be discharged for using an
inappropriate teaching method when she was not notified by the administration that the
method should not be used); Sterzing, 376 F. Supp. at 662 (stating that the teaching
method in question was not prohibited by school regulations); Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at
1392 (explaining that a state must put a teacher on notice when it prohibits a teaching
method that serves a "serious educational purpose" and that is used by the teacher "in
good faith"); Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 357 (holding that a total absence of standards
concerning a teacher's selection and assignment of outside readings deprives teachers of
their First Amendment rights).
203. See Pratt v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1982)(determining that showing the film adaptation of The Lottery was appropriate for a high
school curriculum); Keefe, 418 F.2d at 361-62 (holding that an Atlantic Monthly article
containing an obscenity was legitimate educational material for high school seniors when
the teacher used the article to further educational goals); Bell v. U-32 Bd. of Educ., 630 F.
Supp. 939, 943 (D. Vt. 1986) (discussing the maturity of children as a factor in determining
whether the production of a school play is appropriate); Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 356(holding that a Kurt Vonnegut short story was appropriate reading material for high
school juniors).
204. See Cooper, 611 F.2d at 1113 (stating that a school district's argument that a
teacher's use of a simulation to teach the Reconstruction period of American history was
unprotected private expression failed in light of Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated
School District, 439 U.S. 410, 413, 415-16 (1979), in which the Court held that private
expression by a public employee is protected speech).
205. See Cary, 598 F.2d at 542; see also Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 663-64(6th Cir. 1987) (holding that there was no free speech violation when an R-rated movie
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that the state's legitimate interests in curbing teacher speech
outweighed the teacher's in-class comment0 6 Although all of the
cases denying protection to teacher speech emphasized local control
of the schools over curriculum, only one allowed a school board's
viewpoints to hold sway over the First Amendment.2"7
Although only a few courts have applied the Pickering-Connick-
Mount Healthy standard to in-class teacher expression since the
Hazelwood decision,208 an application of the standard to such speech
is illustrated by the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Kirkland v. Northside
Independent School District.0 9 The plaintiff, a probationary teacher210
shown by a teacher was determined not to be expressive speech); Frison v. Franklin
County Bd. of Educ., 596 F.2d 1192, 1194 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that a state statute
explaining the duties and the grounds for dismissal of a teacher provided a fifth grade
teacher with adequate notice that discussing student notes that contained vulgar words
was not protected speech); Fern v. Thorp, 532 F.2d 1120, 1131 (7th Cir. 1976) (upholding
the discharge of a teacher who failed to follow a school's controversial materials policy
and then did not seek a hearing concerning the discharge); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705,
708 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding a university professor's discharge when she was not
discharged for content of her speech but rather for her pedagogical methods); Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972) (determining that a teacher's overemphasis of
sexual education in a health course and subsequent disputes with colleagues about course
content were not protected speech); Parker v. Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222, 228-29
(D. Md.), affd, 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965) (holding that a teacher did not follow school
regulations in choosing to have his class read Brave New World).
206. See Clark, 474 F.2d at 931-32.
207. See Cary, 598 F.2d at 542-44 (upholding a school board's removal of books from
an approved texts list); Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1391 n.4 ("[I]t has been suggested that
state regulatory control of the classroom is entitled to prevail unless the teacher bears the
heavy burden of proving that it has no rational justification, or is discriminatory on
religious, racial, political, or like grounds." (citations omitted)).
208. See Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1187-88 (6th Cir. 1995)
(holding that a coach's use of racial slurs to motivate his players did not constitute speech
on a matter of public concern); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994)
(determining that a law professor's in-class speech advocating legalization of marijuana
was a matter of public concern); Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 800
(5th Cir. 1989) (deciding that a high school teacher's supplemental reading list was not
protected speech); Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (using
the Pickering test in a case involving a university instructor because the Hazelwood test
was applied in cases concerning the in-class speech of secondary school teachers), affd,
106 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997).
209. 890 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1989).
210. A teacher has probationary status before achieving tenure. See 2 JAMES A. RAPP,
EDUCATION LAW § 6.06[5][b][i] (1999). The probationary period provides teachers with
the chance to prove themselves and gives the employer the opportunity to evaluate a
teacher's performance before providing the teacher with tenure. See id. "As a general
rule, probationary employees have no expectancy of continued employment past the term
of any limited contract .... I" d. Tenure is "a status granted ... under statute, contract or
policy to continue employment subject to dismissal only for adequate cause or where
required due to staff reductions, program changes or financial exigency" and provides "the
most substantial property right to which employees of educational institutions may be
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at a public high school, used a nonapproved reading list in his world
history class, and then sued after the school district decided not to
renew his contract.2  The court determined that, in order for the
teacher to win such a case, he had to establish that his supplemental
reading list was constitutionally protected speech and that such
speech was a motivating factor in the school district's decision not to
renew his contract.212 Assuming that Kirkland could prove these
elements, the school district then would have the opportunity to show
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would not have rehired
Kirkland regardless of his exercise of protected speech.2 13 The court
dismissed the case on the grounds that Kirkland's speech was not
speech on a matter of public concern; it did not conduct the
remainder of the analysis.214 Finally, the court pointed out that
although academic freedom had been recognized as an important
concept, it had never provided teachers with control over the
curriculum;21  therefore, under Hazelwood, school districts could
place reasonable restrictions on a teacher's speech.2 16
The Boring court based its Connick analysis on its prior decision
in DiMeglio v. Haines.21 In DiMeglio, a zoning inspector was
entitled." Id. at § 6.06[l].
211. See Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 795-96.
212. See id. at 797 (using a Mount Healthy test).
213. See id. In addition to citing the use of the nonapproved reading list in not
renewing Kirkland's contract, the school district also listed the following factors: poor
classroom management and discipline of a particular class, poor teaching evaluations, and
mediocre relationships with teachers, parents, and students. See id. at 795-96.
214. See id. at 799-800. A key issue for the court seemed to be that Kirkland did not
attend any of the public hearings that the school district held for public educators, teachers
and parents to determine the reading list for each course. See id. at 800. In addition,
Kirkland did not follow the procedures the school system had established to use
supplemental reading materials: he needed only to have asked for permission to use his
reading list in his classes, but he failed to do so. See id. The court also focused on the fact
that Kirkland had remained silent as to any First Amendment violation by the school
district against him until after his contract was not renewed by the school district. See id.
215. See id.
216. See id. at 800-01. The court made clear that its decision was not "intended to
suggest that public school teachers foster free debate in their classrooms only at their own
risk." Id. at 801. It held "only that that public school teachers are not free, under the
[First [A]mendment, to arrogate control of curricula" and that "[p]arents, administrators,
and elected officials also have a legitimate role in the process of selecting material that will
advance educational goals." Id. at 802.
217. 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995); see also Boring, 136 F.3d at 369 (citing DiMeglio). A
federal district court in Virginia described the Fourth Circuit's three-part public-employee
free speech test: "First, the court must determine 'whether [plaintiff's] speech involved an
issue of public concern.'" Scallet v. Rosenblum, 911" F. Supp. 999, 1012-13 (W.D. Va.
1996) (quoting Hall v. Marion Sch. Dist No. 2, 31 F.3d 183, 192 (4th Cir. 1994)), affd, 106
F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 1997). The Scallet court noted that the Fourth Circuit has held that the
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reassigned to a different geographic area after providing legal advice
to a citizens' group.218 The zoning inspector sued his supervisor,
alleging that his reassignment was in retaliation for his speech. 19 In
its application of the Connick test to the inspector's speech, the court
emphasized the balancing aspect of the testY0  The court then stated
two reasons why the inspector's speech was not protected under the
First Amendment." First, the inspector was speaking as an
employee, rather than as a citizen on a matter of public concern.'
Second, in applying the Pickering balancing test, the court pointed
out that the interests of the state in maintaining office operations may
have outweighed the inspector's speech interests0 3
focus of the public concern inquiry is "whether the 'public' or the 'community' is likely to
be concerned with or interested in the particular expression, or whether it is more
properly viewed as essentially a 'private' matter between employer and employee." Id.
Second, if the speech is found to be on a matter of public concern, then the court must
determine "whether [plaintiff's] exercise of free speech is outweighed by the
' "countervailing interest of the state in providing the public service the teacher was hired
to provide."' " Id. at 1012 (quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 999 (4th Cir. 1985)
(quoting Stroman v. Colleton County Sch. Dist., 981 F.2d 152, 156 (4th Cir. 1992))).
Finally, "the court must determine 'whether [plaintiff] would have been dismissed "but
for" her protected speech' "under a Mount Healthy analysis. Id. at 1013 (quoting Hall, 31
F.3d at 192).
218. See DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 793-94. The zoning inspector, Frank DiMeglio, advised
the Earl's Beach Improvement Association not to accept a settlement offer from a family
who had committed several zoning violations because he felt that the offer required the
Association to allow the family to continue to violate zoning requirements. See id. The
zoning inspector was reprimanded for his behavior and allegedly was told by his
supervisor that he would never be promoted. See id. at 794.
219. See id.
220. See id. at 806 ("[O]nly infrequently will it be 'clearly established' that a public
employee's speech on a matter of public concern is constitutionally protected, because the
relevant inquiry requires a 'particularized balancing' that is subtle, difficult to apply, and
not yet well-defined." (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983); Jackson v.
Bair, 851 F.2d 714,717 (4th Cir. 1988)).
221. See id. at 805.
222. See id. Although the court did not rule out the possibility that a public employee's
speech would be protected when she was speaking in her capacity as an employee, it noted
that precedent indicated that speech as an employee was probably not protected. See id.
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 147; Terrell v. University of Tex. Sys. Police, 792 F.2d 1360,
1362 (5th Cir. 1986)). Because the inspector was suing his supervisor (the Zoning
Commissioner for Baltimore County) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Commissioner had a
defense of qualified immunity, which provides protection to officials "'as long as their
actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to
have violated.'" Id. at 794 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
Qualified immunity provides protection to those officials "'insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.'" Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Therefore, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Commissioner "reasonably could have
believed that [the inspector-employee's] speech was not protected." Id. at 805.
223. See id. at 805-06. The Commissioner, therefore, had a reasonable belief that the
1993
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Although the concept of academic freedom is closely aligned
with First Amendment issues, such freedom must be balanced with
school board control of curriculum. The Court has long suggested
that the doctrine of academic freedom provides some constitutional
protection, at least for college and university professors and
instructors. 4  The Supreme Court has been clear as to the
importance of academic freedom within a democratic society: "Our
Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which
is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned. That freedom is ... a special concern of the First
Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom."' In addition, in a case striking a
statute requiring as a condition of employment that teachers list the
organizations to which they belonged, the Court has noted that "[t]he
vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools. ' m6
The rationale for academic freedom was most clearly
summarized in Mailloux v. Kiley, 7 in which a federal district court
explained that society needs teachers to serve as role models of
"democratic citizen[s]" and to teach students how to adapt to a
continually changing environment by exposing students to new ideas
and independent thought?8 This embrace of academic freedom has
inspector's right to speak was outweighed by the interests of the state. See id. at 806 ("A
government employer.., is entitled to insist upon obedience to the legitimate day-to-day
decisions of the office without fear of reprisal in the form of lawsuits from disgruntled
subordinates who believe that they know better than their supervisors how to manage
office affairs.").
224. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("To impose any
straitjacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the
future of our Nation.... Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate ... ; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die." (quoting
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion))); see also Zykan
v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1980) (questioning the
"appropriate role" of academic freedom in the secondary school environment). But see
Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating that there is a "strong
predilection for academic freedom as an adjunct of the free speech rights of the First
Amendment," but that there is no "support to conclude that academic freedom is an
independent First Amendment right"). See generally W. Stuart Stuller, High School
Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77 NEB. L. REv. 301 (1998)
(tracing the evolution of substantive and procedural academic freedom in secondary
public schools).
225. Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
226. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,487 (1960).
227. 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971).
228. Id- at 1391 ("The Constitution recognized [academic freedom] in order to foster
open minds, creative imaginations, and adventurous spirits.").
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not been freely extended to elementary and secondary teachers by
the courts, however, due to the "special characteristics of the school
environment." 9  These special circumstances include the age and
maturity of elementary and secondary students as well as the dueling
purposes of the public schools: the inculcation of values "'necessary
to the maintenance of a democratic political system,' " and the
toleration and exploration of "unpopular and controversial [social,
political, and religious] views."'' 0 The courts have established that the
final decision as to curriculum lies with the school board, but most
courts have acknowledged that school board control is not absolute"3
Some courts, however, have refused to find a right to academic
229. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); see
also Webb v. Lake Mills Community Sch. Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791, 799 (N.D. Iowa 1972)
(acknowledging that academic freedom extends to secondary and elementary teachers but
noting that "[tihe state interest in limiting the discretion of teachers grows stronger... as
the age of the students decreases" and, therefore, that the academic freedom of such
teachers is not the same as that given to college instructors).
230. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting Ambach v.
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979)); see also Fowler v. Board of Educ., 819 F.2d 657, 661
(Oth Cir. 1987) (stating that the" 'inculcation of values' is a" 'special circumstance' "to be
taken into account in determining a teacher's First Amendment rights in the classroom)
(quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681); Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300,
1304 (7th Cir. 1980) (naming two factors limiting academic freedom in secondary schools:
students' intellectual development and the nurturing of values as it conflicts with
developing intellect); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 707 (6th Cir. 1973) ("The First
Amendment guarantee of academic freedom.., does not require a University or school to
tolerate any manner of teaching method the teacher may choose to employ."); Clark v.
Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1971) ("[W]e do not conceive academic freedom to be
a license for uncontrolled expression at variance with established curricular content and
internally destructive of the proper functioning of the institution."); Keefe v. Geanakos,
418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir. 1969) (stating that "the offensiveness of the language and the
particular propriety or impropriety" of the speech at issue is dependent on the age of the
students in question); Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 307 (E.D. Tex.
1979) (stating that a teacher's academic freedom may be controlled by the school if the in-
class speech disrupts classroom learning or discipline to "a material or substantial
degree"); Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1391 n.4 ("The so-called constitutional right is not
absolute .... Analytically,... it is less a right than a constitutionally recognized interest.
Clearly the teacher's right must yield to compelling [and possibly merely reasonable]
public interest of greater constitutional significance."); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp.
352,355 (M.D. Ala. 1970) ("The right to academic freedom... is not absolute and must be
balanced against the competing interest of society.").
231. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("[The
education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and
state and local officials, and not of federal judges."); Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683 (holding that
in cases concerning student symbolic speech, "[t]he determination of what manner of
speech in the classroom ... is inappropriate properly rests with the school board"); Board
of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982) (plurality opinion) ("The Court has long
recognized that local school boards have broad discretion in the management of school
affairs."); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("[P]ublic education in our
Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities.").
1995
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freedom for secondary or elementary teachers.?2 Other courts have
recognized academic freedom for elementary and secondary teachers,
but have defined it in different ways. 3 One commentator's definition
of academic freedom summarizes the courts' varying definitions
rather well: "the right of teachers to teach as they think appropriate,
to speak freely about their subjects, to experiment with new ideas,
and to select the teaching methods and materials they think best
suited to their instructional task."' 34 Several courts, however, have
expanded their conception of academic freedom to embrace two
distinct academic freedom rights: a teacher's substantive right to
choose classroom materials that serve an established pedagogical
objective and a teacher's procedural right to notice of proscribed
teaching methods 35
In addition to academic freedom and standards of free speech
protection, the issue of notice has been compelling for all courts that
have addressed it. 6 Prior notice that the conduct or speech at issue is
232. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991); Bradley v.
Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 910 F.2d 1172,1176 (3d Cir. 1990).
233. See Fowler, 819 F.2d at 661 (recognizing the academic freedom right of public
school teachers "to exercise professional judgment in selecting topics and materials for use
in the course of the educational process"); Hetrick, 480 F.2d at 707 ("The First
Amendment guarantee of academic freedom provides a teacher with the right to
encourage a vigorous exchange of ideas within the confines of the subject matter being
taught.. . ."); Clark, 474 F.2d at 931 (stating that academic freedom is "the preservation of
the classroom as a 'market place' of ideas"); Dean, 486 F. Supp. at 307 ("[A] teacher has a
constitutional right protected by the First Amendment to engage in a teaching method of
his or her own choosing, even though the subject matter may be controversial or
sensitive."); Webb, 344 F. Supp. at 805 (defining academic freedom as a teacher's
"freedom to employ methods of teaching reasonably relevant to the subject matter [the
teacher] was employed to teach"); Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1390 (identifying both a
substantive right and a procedural right of academic freedom); Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at
355 (identifying academic freedom as an unenumerated right of the First Amendment that
includes "the right to teach, to inquire, to evaluate, and to study").
234. Laurie L. Mesibov, Teacher-Board of Education Conflicts over Instructional
Materials, SCH. L. BULL., Winter 1991, at 10, 11.
235. See Keefe, 418 F.2d at 362-63 ("It does not follow that a teacher may not be on
notice of impropriety from the circumstances of a case without the necessity of a
regulation."); Webb, 344 F. Supp. at 799-800 (reading Eighth Circuit precedent to embrace
the procedural prong of academic freedom); Mailloux, 323 F. Supp. at 1390 (affirming "the
procedural right of a teacher not to be discharged for the use of a teaching method which
was not proscribed by a regulation"); Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 356-57 (holding that
teachers must receive notice as to "what conduct is permissible and what conduct is
proscribed").
236. See Lacks v. Ferguson Reorganized Sch. Dist., 147 F.3d 718, 723 (8th Cir. 1998)
(holding that a school district must give a teacher notice as to what expression is
prohibited in class); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993) (same) (citing
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)); Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763
F.2d 211, 214-15 (6th Cir. 1985) (determining that a teacher's speech rights were violated
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prohibited is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment? 7 The vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or
regulation be definite enough so that the average person can
understand what conduct is prohibited?18  When the proscribed
conduct implicates the First Amendment, the standards for judging
vagueness are more stringently applied.?39 The rationale behind such
when the teacher followed the administrator's directions but was suspended and "told that
he would 'never see the inside of a Memphis classroom again' "), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Keefe, 418 F.2d
at 362 (stating that a school regulation was unclear and would probably provide
inadequate notice); Dean, 486 F. Supp. at 309 (holding that a school district violated due
process by discharging a teacher without first providing her with notice that her conduct
was proscribed); Moore v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 357 F. Supp. 1037, 1040
(W.D.N.C. 1973) (deciding that a student-initiated discussion with a student teacher about
evolution in the context of a lesson about world religions did not violate school board
policy when the school board had not established any standards as to such conduct);
Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 662 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (ruling that
the teaching method in question was not prohibited by any school regulation); Webb, 344
F. Supp. at 804 (stating that a teacher cannot be discharged for using an inappropriate
teaching method when not notified by the administration that such method should not be
used); Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 357 (determining that there was a total absence of
standards provided to teachers to determine which books were obscene); Board of Educ.
v. Wilder, 960 P.2d 695, 706 (Colo. 1998) (stating that when a teacher is entitled to
reasonable notice of prohibited materials, a published regulation filed in the school's
library is adequate); Stuller, supra note 224, at 317-33, 339-43 (discussing the evolution of
notice in secondary teacher free speech cases as a procedural academic freedom right).
237. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .. "); see also Parducci, 316 F. Supp.
at 357 ("Our laws in this country have long recognized that no person should be punished
for conduct unless such conduct has been proscribed in clear and precise terms.") (citing
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
238. See Ward, 996 F.2d at 454 ("The relevant inquiry is: based on existing regulations,
policies, discussions, and other forms of communication between school administration
and teachers, was it reasonable for the school to expect the teacher to know that her
conduct was prohibited?"); Fowler, 819 F.2d at 664 (explaining that due process rights are
infringed when citizens must guess at the meaning of a written law); Dean, 486 F. Supp. at
305 (holding that a teacher did not receive notice that the use of certain classroom
materials required prior administration approval where school administration officials
"failed to agree on when a conference was held with [the teacher], where it was held, and
what she was told" and where there was no written record of a conference); Wilder, 960
P.2d at 703 n.8 ("[A]n impermissibly vague law fails to provide fair notice of what conduct
is prohibited and allows arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.").
239. See Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 357; see also Dean, 486 F. Supp. at 309
("Governmental regulation of First Amendment activities has traditionally been required
to be precise. An offhand comment to [a teacher], the meaning of which was likely to be
vague or ambiguous, cannot pass Constitutional muster .... "); Moore, 357 F. Supp. at
1040 (stating that "no person should be punished for conduct unless such conduct has been
proscribed in clear and precise terms" ... and that "[w]hen the conduct being punished
involves First Amendment rights ... the standards for judging permissible vagueness will
be even more strictly applied"); Webb, 344 F. Supp. at 801 (stating that "[it is the
prevailing law of the land that no person shall be punished for conduct unless such
1997
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review is as follows: If the absence of standards or the lack of clear
standards forces a teacher to guess whether subjects or materials
might be appropriate, the teacher may well tend to be overly hesitant
in the classroom.24 Such reticence contradicts the purpose of
academic freedom, thereby defeating the public's interest in the
teacher's use of professional judgment in determining reasonable
methods to teach information, values, and skills within the
classroom.24 It also allows school officials to act arbitrarily in
dismissing those teachers whose methods or discussions contain
controversial ideas2 42
In some cases addressing the issue of notice, a teacher had
consulted with and received approval from the principal as to her
teaching methods and materials, but was disciplined despite such
consultation.243 At least one court has determined that such discipline
violated First Amendment rights and therefore reinstated the
teacher.2" Even in cases where teachers have lost their claims that
their free speech rights were violated, the courts have stated that the
standard of review for firings after the fact should be less
accommodating to the school board than in situations where the
school system has given a teacher adequate prior notice.2 45
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Boring illustrates the confusion
faced by the lower courts in developing a standard by which to
analyze in-class teacher speech. Although the court relied on
Hazelwood to determine whether the production of a play was part of
the school curriculum,246 it then applied a Connick test to Boring's
conduct has been proscribed in clear and precise terms," which "is especially true when
the conduct involves First Amendment rights").
240. See Moore, 357 F. Supp. at 1040; Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 357.
241. See Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1391 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd per curiam,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971); see also Webb, 344 F. Supp. at 805 (noting that termination
without prior notice has a chilling effect on a teacher's academic freedom "to innovate and
to develop new and more effective teaching methods which are reasonably relevant to the
subject matter they are assigned to teach").
24Z See Parducci, 316 F. Supp. at 357; see also Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist.,
376 F. Supp. 657, 661 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (stating that a teacher's academic freedom should
"not be so lightly regarded that he stands in jeopardy of dismissal for raising controversial
issues" in the classroom).
243. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 364 (transfer); Stachura v. Truskowski, 763 F.2d 211, 213-
14 (6th Cir. 1985) (dismissal), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Memphis Community Sch.
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
244. See Stachura, 763 F.2d at 213-14.
245. See Krizek v. Board of Educ., 713 F. Supp. 1131, 1142 (N.D. Ill. 1989). The court
in Krizek also noted that prior restraint was more permissible than after-the-fact
punishment for in-class teacher speech. See id. at n.5.
246. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 368.
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conduct to determine whether her expression was constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment. The court held that her
transfer as a result of the selection and production of the play was not
a matter of public concern, but merely an employment dispute.247
Boring is anomalous in several respects. First, the use of the
Connick standard for teacher speech within the school environment
ignores the "special characteristics" of the school environment.24 It
may, in fact, be more appropriate to treat the selection of the play the
same way that other courts have treated the removal of books from
school libraries.249 Second, the court's interpretation of "legitimate
pedagogical concerns" is so overbroad as to effectively eliminate any
balance between teacher First Amendment rights and local school
officials' control over the curriculum in favor of the school board.250
Third, the court summarily dismissed the notice issue in a case where
the teacher followed the rules laid out by the principal and
superintendent of the school system and obtained administrative
approval for her actions on several different occasions."' In other
cases, such action by the administration has been sufficient for courts
247. See id.
248. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text (discussing factors of the school
environment mentioned by the Court in Hazelwood to justify deference to school control
over school-sponsored speech).
249. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 872 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(stating that a school board may not remove books from the library "simply because they
dislike the ideas contained in those books"); Pratt v. Independent Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670
F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[A] cognizable First Amendment claim exists if the book
was excluded to suppress an ideological or religious viewpoint with which the local
authorities disagreed."); Zykan v. Warsaw Community Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306
(7th Cir. 1980) (determining that school authorities may not "substitute rigid and exclusive
indoctrination for the mere exercise of their prerogative to make pedagogic choices
regarding matters of legitimate dispute"); Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10th
Cir. 1979) ("Censorship or suppression of expression of opinion, even in the classroom,
should be tolerated only when there is a legitimate interest of the state which can be said
to require priority."); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.
1976) (refusing to allow the school board to remove books from the school library because
school board members found the books socially or politically offensive); Case v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 233, 895 F. Supp. 1463, 1468-69 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Pico for the
proposition that school officials may not remove a book from a school library because they
disagree with ideas contained within the book).
250. See Perry A. Zirkel, Boring or Bunkum?, 79 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 791,792 (1998).
251. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 371 n.3. Boring raised the issue as an alternative
argument. However, the panel decided not to determine the issue because the case was
before it on a motion to dismiss, and it anticipated the issue would be dealt with at trial.
See Boring, 98 F.3d at 1484. There was a dispute between Boring and the school board as
to whether she properly raised her notice argument on appeal. See id. The en banc
majority, however, summarily dismissed the notice issue because Boring "had no First
Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum." Boring, 136 F.3d at
371 n.2 (emphasis added).
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to find a First Amendment violation of teacher rights . 2
In its application of the Connick standard, the Boring court
turned first to its previous application of the standard in DiMeglio v.
Haines.253 The rationale employed by the court in DiMeglio placed
great emphasis on the government employer's right to conduct daily
office operations without fear of lawsuits from employees who felt
they understood better than their superiors how to handle the
office.5' The Pickering-Connick-Mount Healthy line of cases,
however, was designed to apply to a teacher's out-of-class speech 5
and seems inappropriate to evaluate the protection to be afforded to
in-class curricular speech. The standard does not properly consider
the special nature of a teacher's in-class speech, which has significant
consequences for society as a whole because teachers are the primary
actors responsible for educating students.56 The Boring court did not
suggest any rationale for its use of the Connick standard, nor did it
evaluate the special considerations of a teacher within the
classroom. 7 Its only concern seemed to be to give as much weight as
252. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452, 454-55 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that a
school board must provide a teacher with notice of prohibited conduct); Stachura v.
Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211, 213-14 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that a teacher's speech rights
were violated when the teacher followed an administrator's directions and was suspended
nonetheless), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Frison v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 596 F.2d 1192,
1193-94 (4th Cir. 1979) (holding that under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, a
teacher was entitled to prior notice that her in-class speech was grounds for adverse
employment action, but that a state law specifying the conduct of public teachers provided
sufficient notice); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.) (determining that
a teacher's First Amendment rights were violated when that teacher was not given notice
that his teaching method should not have been used), affd per curiam, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st
Cir. 1971).
253. 45 F.3d 790 (4th Cir. 1995); see also supra notes 217-23 and accompanying text
(discussing the court's application of the DiMeglio standard).
254. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 369 (quoting DiMeglio, 45 F.3d at 806).
255. See Clarick, supra note 2, at 700-01.
256. See Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 777 (10th Cir. 1991) (stating that
Pickering addresses a state's interests as an employer, but not as an educator); Scallet v.
Rosenblum, 911 F. Supp. 999, 1011 (W.D. Va. 1996) (noting that the Pickering test "does
not explicitly account for the.., tradition of academic freedom"); Clarick, supra note 2, at
702 (noting that the Pickering-Connick analysis "provides an inappropriate model for the
examination of teachers' in-class speech"); cf. J. Albert Ellis, Comment, Public Teachers'
Right to Free Speech- "A Matter of Public Concern," 12 S.U. L. REV. 217, 247-48 (1986)
(stating that the Connick test chills a teacher's free speech rights and leads to government
censorship); John M. Ryan, Comment, Teacher Free Speech in the Public Schools: Just
When You Thought It Was Safe to Talk, 67 NEB. L. REV. 695, 715 (1988) (discussing the
problems of the public concern and balancing tests as applied to teachers' speech). But see
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 572 n.13 (declining to distinguish Pickering as the
test to be applied only to out-of-class speech).
257. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 371 n.2. The court dismissed the use of the Hazelwood
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possible to the local school board in order to keep federal courts from
interfering with school affairs."
Although the school board's burden of proof is lower than that
of the teacher regardless of whether a Pickering-Connick analysis or a
Hazelwood analysis is used, Hazelwood provides more deference to
the school board's actions. The main advantage to a school board in
using the Connick analysis is that if a teacher's speech is not found to
be on a matter of public concern, a First Amendment claim fails and
may be dismissed at an early stage. Such a dismissal will save the
school board the time and expense of litigation.259 If the court
proceeds to a balancing test, however, the school board's decision
receives no deference.26  Hazelwood, on the other hand, favors
school officials, and the body of precedent using this analysis is quite
large.261  According to every court that has considered the issue,
school boards have a "legitimate pedagogical interest" in developing
the curriculum and requiring teachers to follow it, in providing that
teachers utilize professional judgment, and in prohibiting the use of
obscene speech.262 A disadvantage of using the Hazelwood analysis
for school districts has been that judges are reluctant to grant a
dismissal of the case in favor of the school system before trial, thereby
subjecting the school districts to higher costs of litigation even when
the judge believes that the teacher is unlikely to win.263
The Boring court's holding that curriculum, by definition,
constitutes a "legitimate pedagogical concern,"2  is overbroad. Both
the teacher and the school have some constitutionally protected
interests in the curriculum. To hold that the school's interest
automatically trumps any interest of the teacher ignores the unique
characteristics of the school environment and the teacher's role
within such a setting.265 The court's decision in Boring seems to rest
standard because the case did not implicate student speech. See id.
258. See icL at 370-71. Judge Luttig also was concerned with allowing local control so
that the Board did not have to condone the production of "a play on lesbianism in the
classrooms of the County's high school." ld at 372 (Luttig, J., concurring).
259. See Stuller, supra note 158, at 2.
260. See id
261. See id.; see also supra notes 169-99 and accompanying text (discussing the lower
court's use and application of the Hazelwood standard).
262. See id. (citing Miles, 944 F.2d at 779; Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890
F.2d 794,795 (5th Cir. 1989); Virgil v. School Bd., 862 F.2d 1517,1523 (11th Cir. 1989)).
263. See id.
264. Boring, 136 F.3d at 370.
265. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (plurality opinion)
("[T]he discretion of... local school boards in matters of education must be exercised in a
manner that comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment.");
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primarily upon a policy determination that the curriculum of a school
should be set by the local school authorities who are responsible to
the public, rather than by teachers who are responsible only to
judges.266 This interpretation is further supported by Judge Luttig's
assertion that in the context of teacher in-class curricular speech a
teacher deserves no First Amendment protection.267 Yet that
conclusion is in direct conflict with the decisions of other federal
courts of appeals and with the precedent of the Supreme Court
itself.26
8
As one commentator has noted,269 the majority in Boring
ironically has granted students more rights than teachers within the
confines of school-sponsored or curricular speech."0 Another
commentator has stated that the use of the Hazelwood standard to
restrict teacher speech is both "ominous" and "questionable," 271
predicting that the dangers that will result echo the Supreme Court's
concerns about a lack of academic freedom in the nation's institutions
of learning: A school board may intrude far beyond acceptable
boundaries on teachers' professional judgment as how best to
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir. 1972) (weighing the school board's
discretion over curriculum against the First Amendment rights of teachers within the
classroom); Clarick, supra note 2, at 697-98 (discussing the balance between the "interests
of the state as educator and employer, and the interests of teachers ... to act, think, and
speak free of state coercion").
266. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 371.
267. See id. at 373 (Luttig, J., concurring).
268. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)
(stating that teachers possess First Amendment rights in the schools); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (explaining that teacher speech is a "special concern
of the First Amendment"); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,250 (1957) (plurality
opinion) ("Teachers ... must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate
.... "); Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1011-12 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that in-class teacher
speech is protected under the First Amendment); Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st
Cir. 1993) ("[Tleachers retain their First Amendment right to free speech in school.");
Miles v. Denver Pub. Schs., 944 F.2d 773, 775-77 (10th Cir. 1991) (implying that a teacher's
in-class speech is protected to a very limited degree under the First Amendment);
Kingsville Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Cooper, 611 F.2d 1109, 1113 (5th Cir. 1980) (ruling that
"classroom discussion is protected activity"); Minarcini v. Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541
F.2d 577, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1976) (explaining that classroom discussions and having books in
a school library are both protected under the First Amendment).
269. See Zirkel, supra note 250, at 792.
270. See Cary v. Board of Educ., 598 F.2d 535, 543 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting that if
students have free speech rights in the classroom under Tinker, teachers must have some
measure of protected speech with respect to teaching); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359,
362 (1st Cir. 1969) ("It is hard to think that any student could walk into the library and
receive a book, but that his teacher could not subject the content to serious discussion in
class"). But see Miles, 944 F.2d at 777 (refusing "to distinguish between the classroom
discussion of students and teachers" in deciding to apply Hazelwood analysis).
271. Reutter, supra note 13, at 353.
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communicate materials and values to their classes. 2  In addition,
teacher creativity in terms of both materials and methods may be
stifled to the extent that a school board's function in inculcating
values trumps free inquiry and debate.27 3 Boring would appear to be
such a case.
Although some courts have embraced deference to local school
control-even going so far as to acknowledge that the fact that
curriculum decisions "are usually governed by school administrators'
social, political, and moral tastes is fully consistent with local control
over primary and secondary education," 274-those same courts have
also acknowledged that there is a line past which school
administrators may not go.275  The schools' purpose of value
inculcation cannot prohibit viewpoints that contradict the values the
school is attempting to instill in its students. The courts also have
272. See id- at 354; see also Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603 ("The classroom is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to [the] robust exchange of ideas .... "); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250 (plurality
opinion) ("Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to
evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate
and die.").
273. See Reutter, supra note 13, at 354.
274. Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 218 (3d Cir. 1981) (Rosenn, J., concurring); see
also Cary, 598 F.2d at 543 (explaining that the school curriculum serves a legitimate state
interest when it reflects the value system of the community). But see Keefe, 418 F.2d at
361-62 ("With the greatest of respect to ... parents, their sensibilities are not the full
measure of what is proper education.").
275. See Kirkland v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., 890 F.2d 794, 801-02 (5th Cir. 1989)
(stating that teachers, parents, administrators, and school board members share a role "in
the process of selecting material that will advance educational goals"); Seyfried, 668 F.2d
at 219-20 (Rosenn, J., concurring) (acknowledging that school officials' curricular
decisions "regarding grade school, and perhaps junior high school students" are entitled to
"more deference" than are decisions involving high school students); Pratt v. Independent
Sch. Dist. No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1982) ("[S]chool boards do not have an
absolute right to remove materials from the curriculum."); Zykan v. Warsaw Community
Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1980) ("[T]he discretion lodged in local school
boards is not completely unfettered by constitutional considerations."); Bell v. U-32 Bd. of
Educ., 630 F. Supp. 939, 944 (D. Vt. 1986) (explaining that a school board's motivation
concerning a curriculum decision must be examined to determine if the board has violated
the First Amendment); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 357 (M.D. Ala. 1970)
("However wide the discretion of school officials, such discretion cannot be exercised so as
to arbitrarily deprive teachers of their First Amendment rights."); see also Cary, 598 F.2d
at 543 ("Censorship or suppression of expression of opinion, even in the classroom, should
be tolerated only when there is a legitimate interest of the state which can be said to
require priority." (citing West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633
(1943))). In Seyfried, the court limited school board control by requiring courts to show
less deference to school officials' decisions both as the age of the students involved
increases and when a board "attempt[s] to exclude a particular point of view from open
consideration in the school." Seyfried, 668 F.2d at 220 (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97, 107 (1968)).
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recognized that school officials who use the pretext of preventing
students from exposure to indecent material in order to censor
politically controversial ideas are overstepping their bounds.2 76
Courts that recognize a more liberal academic freedom interest
for teachers have insisted that Supreme Court precedent
acknowledges that viewpoint discrimination is not allowed in the
classroom by the school board.277 Under this approach, the dismissal
of a teacher for presenting material that exposes students to
unpopular views violates the spirit of the First Amendment and
provides a greater threat to the community than does the exposure of
the students to topics traditionally held to be taboo.278 Although
Hazelwood shifted the balance in favor of the school board, decisions
decided post-Hazelwood also have prohibited viewpoint
discrimination by school officials. 279
The Boring court's reliance on the Fifth Circuit's opinion in
Kirkland as to the notice issue seems incorrect. In Kirkland there
were clear guidelines established for the teacher to follow that he
chose to ignore8 0 In contrast, Margaret Boring notified the principal
of the name of the play (as she had done each year before without
issue) and modified the play according to the principal's request
before the performance of the play at the state competition.M1 Boring
complied with all of the guidelines that the school administration
asked her to follow. Yet, reasoning that "the plaintiff had no First
Amendment right to participate in the makeup of the curriculum,"
276. See Pratt, 670 F.2d at 776-77 (ruling against a school board that decided to remove
a particular film from the curriculum when the board believed that the students' religious
and family values were threatened); Keefe, 418 F.2d at 361 (explaining that if a teacher's
use of a "dirty" word for an educational purpose would shock high school seniors, "we
would fear for their future.").
277. See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining that
more than a decade of Supreme Court precedent "causes no doubt that we cannot
countenance school authorities arbitrarily censuring a teacher's speech merely because
they do not agree with the teacher's political philosophies or leanings"); Dean v. Timpson
Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 308 (E.D. Tex. 1979) ("Epperson teaches that a
particular subject or theory may not be forbidden in the classroom simply because it
offends the dominant views or beliefs of a community." (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393
U.S. 97,107-09 (1968))).
27& See Dean, 486 F. Supp. at 308.
279. See, e.g., Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 1989) ("Although
Hazelwood provides reasons for allowing a school official to discriminate based on
content, we do not believe it offers any justification for allowing educators to discriminate
based on viewpoint.").
280. See Kirkland, 890 F.2d at 796.
281. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 375 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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the en banc majority dismissed Boring's claim of lack of notice.m
The Fourth Circuit's analysis of teacher in-class speech in cases
such as Boring could be improved by using a balancing test that
considers the unique nature of a teacher's classroom speech,
acknowledges the motivation behind the school board's actions, and
includes the procedural concern of notice. To achieve these goals, a
two-part test could be employed. First, courts could use a
reasonableness test that would consider whether the teacher's speech
violated a legitimate pedagogical concern of the school in light of the
school board's motivation for its action against the teacher. The
second part of the test would look to whether the teacher had
adequate notice that such material was prohibited.m3 The first step
would combine the legitimate pedagogical concerns analysis of
Hazelwood 4 with the Pico Court's insistence that viewpoint
discrimination not be allowed to chill protected speech,2 while
acknowledging a teacher's substantive right to academic freedom.
The second step would address the procedural aspect of academic
freedom and protect those teachers who, like Boring, complied with
the rules established by the school administration but who were used
by the administration as shields from public protest.
The implications for the First Amendment rights of secondary
public school teachers in the Fourth Circuit after Boring appear grim.
As Jeremiah Collins, attorney for Ms. Boring, pointed out, "a good
teacher will almost always be engaged in instructional activities that
someone may regard as controversial, thus leading to discipline after
the fact without notice or any justification. '286 The decision appears
to be grounded on faith in the local electoral process and a policy
rationale that embraces local control of the schools to the exclusion of
teachers' constitutional fights.m As the dissent in Boring noted, "the
majority eliminates all constitutional protection for the in-class
speech of teachers,"2' thereby destroying any balance between school
officials and the teachers who educate our youth as to the appropriate
282 Id. at 371 n.2.
283. See Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993); see also Board of Educ. v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863-64 (1982) (acknowledging the "broad discretion" to be accorded to
local school authorities over curriculum and balancing that discretion against teachers' and
students' rights under the First Amendment).
284. See supra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 162-68 and accompanying text.
286. Zirkel, supra note 250, at 792.
287. See Boring, 136 F.3d at 371; see also id. (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring); id. at 373-74
(Luttig, J., concurring).
288. Id. at 380 (Motz, J., dissenting).
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values of a democratic society. Stifling controversy in the name of
local control and majoritarian politics does not further this end.2 9
KARA LYNN GRICE
289. See Zirkel, supra note 250, at 792 (explaining that several vocal members of the
public attended the school board meeting, alleging that the play was obscene and that
Boring was immoral). In Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986),
the court upheld a teacher's free speech rights when public protest caused school
administrators to relinquish any responsibility for the teacher's choice of teaching methods
and materials, even though those same officials had approved the materials before they
were used. See id. at 213-15.
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